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Starting with Steele and Aronson (1995), research documents the performance 
decrements resulting from the activation of a negative task-relevant stereotype.  I suggest 
that negative stereotypes can generate better performance, as they produce a prevention 
focus (Higgins, 2000; Seibt & Förster, 2004), because a prevention focus leads to greater 
cognitive flexibility in a task where points are lost (Maddox, Markman, & Baldwin, 
2006).  My prior work, Experiments 1 and 2, done in collaboration with Arthur B. 
Markman, W. Todd Maddox, and Grant C. Baldwin, used a category learning task that 
requires the participant test different explicit rules to correctly categorize stimuli.  Half of 
the participants gained points for correct responses while half of the participants lost 
points for correct responses.  We primed a positive or a negative gender stereotype.  The 
negative prime matches the losses environment while the positive prime matches the 
gains environment.  The match states are assumed to increase dopamine release into 
frontal brain areas leading to increased cognitive flexibility and better task performance 
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whereas the mismatch states should not.  Thus, we predict and obtain a 3-way interaction 
between Stereotype (Positive, Negative), Gender (Male, Female), and Reward structure 
(Gains, Losses) for accuracy and strategy.   
Experiments 3 and 4 used a category learning task, which requires the implicit 
learning system to govern participant responses.  This task had an information-integration 
category structure and involves the striatum (e.g., Maddox & Ashby, 2004).  Importantly, 
cognitive flexibility will hurt performance using this category structure.  I therefore 
predicted that regulatory match states, created by manipulating Stereotype and Reward 
structure, will produce worse performance than mismatch states.  I did not completely 
reverse the effects described in Experiments 1 and 2 as predicted.  I found evidence 
supporting my predictions using computational models to test for task strategy in 
Experiment 3 and found results consistent with the flexibility hypothesis in Experiment 4.  
Importantly, I believe that stereotype threat effects should not be conceptualized as a 
main effect with negative stereotypes producing worse performance than positive 
stereotypes, but instead as an interaction between the motivational state of the individual, 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
Usually cognitive psychologists reside in their ivory tower brimming to the top 
with disembodied symbols.  These symbols combine to become mental representations 
that are the building blocks of thought.  Although it is clearly a worthy and very 
challenging pursuit to determine the structure of mental representations and the processes 
that act on them, I believe cognitive psychologists often fall short in their efforts to 
explain cognition because they neglect a critical piece of the puzzle –motivation.  
Without understanding why people act, what goals they are trying to meet, and how the 
motivational system is engaged to promote goal attainment, cognitive psychology will 
fail to provide an appropriate model of cognitive processing. 
My research directly examines the motivational factors that drive behavior.  These 
factors are always present.  Consider the undergraduate research participant trying 
desperately to complete the research requirement in the last week of the semester.   This 
individual is trying to avoid the very negative outcome of receiving an incomplete in a 
course.  It would be naïve to believe that this individual enters a psychology experiment, 
turns off her motivational system, and performs a typical cognitive task without any 
motivational arousal.   
In the service of understanding the role of the motivational system, my 
dissertation examines the influence of the motivational system on cognitive processing.  
Often ignored by cognitive psychologists, the motivational system critically influences 
cognition.  For example, as demonstrated by Markman, Maddox, and colleagues 
(Markman, Baldwin, & Maddox, 2005), very subtle manipulations of regulatory focus 
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(Higgins, 1997b), a motivational variable, can produce drastically different patterns of 
responses depending on whether a classification task is framed in terms of gains or in 
terms of losses.  While this result may seem unremarkable, the potential ramifications of 
this and related work are profound.  As they argue, classic psychological research tends 
to require participants to acquire points, get correct answers, or, at the largest grain size, 
gain course credit.  As such, individuals predisposed to deal with an environment of gains 
will perform better than an individual predisposed to deal with an environment of losses.   
I use this framework to investigate a possible cause of stereotype threat effects.  
Stereotypes impact human cognition and are a pervasive part of human experience.  
Starting with Steele and Aronson (1995),  research documents the negative impact on 
performance given the activation of a negative task-relevant stereotype.  In their studies, 
Black participants underperformed White participants on tests of intellectual ability when 
the test was framed as diagnostic of their ability.  These decrements occur in a range of 
domains from the academic sector to athletic performance and are known as stereotype 
threat effects (Aronson, Lustina, Good, Keough, & Steele, 1999; Stone, Lynch, 
Sjomeling, & Darley, 1999). 
There have been many posited stereotype threat mechanisms.  For example, 
stereotype threat effects may occur because of too much effort or too little effort, self-
handicapping, anxiety, or low performance confidence (Smith, 2004).  Seibt and Förster 
(2004)  argue that activating stereotypes induces regulatory foci, which in turn influence 
performance.  They demonstrate that a negative stereotype induces a prevention focus 
while a positive stereotype induces a promotion focus.  Critically, they frame the 
influence of regulatory foci as an interaction of focus and processing requirements:  a 
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promotion focus induced by a positive stereotype leads to better performance and a 
prevention focus induced by a negative stereotype leads to worse performance if 
elaborative processing is required.  Conversely, negative stereotypes lead to better 
performance than positive stereotypes when vigilant processing is required.   
In contrast, I argue that stereotype threat effects occur because of the interaction 
between the induced regulatory focus, the reward structure of the task, and the type of 
task.  Seibt and Förster’s account fails to consider the effects of regulatory fit produced 
from focus and task reward structure.  As demonstrated by Maddox, Markman, and 
colleagues (Maddox, Baldwin, & Markman, 2006; Maddox, Markman, & Baldwin, 2007; 
Markman, Baldwin et al., 2005; Markman, Maddox, & Baldwin, 2005; Markman, 
Maddox, & Worthy, 2006),  the reward structure of the task interacts with the induced 
regulatory focus.  Given a task that involves gains and non-gains, individuals with a 
promotion focus are experiencing a regulatory match while individuals with a prevention 
focus are experiencing a regulatory mismatch.  Likewise, given a task that involves 
losses and non-losses, individuals with a promotion focus are experiencing a regulatory 
mismatch and prevention-focused participants are experiencing a regulatory match.   
For example, assume that there exists a negative stereotype for women and a 
positive stereotype for men in mathematics.  When confronted with a standard math test, 
prevention-focused women and promotion-focused men are trying to get test problems 
correct.  That is, they are trying to gain points.  Using the regulatory fit framework, 
women are in a mismatch and should perform poorly while men are in a match and 
should perform well.  In contrast, altering the test goal to emphasize avoiding incorrect 
answers changes the test structure from gains to losses.  This reverses the predicted 
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gender effect because the fit pairings change; women are now in a match and men in a 
mismatch.  
Further, I argue that the stereotype threat effects in the literature are likely the 
result of prevention-focused participants completing gains/non-gains tasks that require 
flexible processing.  This argument relies on the presence of a three-way interaction the 
regulatory focus of the individual, the reward structure of the task, and the type of task.  
Individuals can be in a regulatory match or mismatch based on how their primed or 
chronic focus corresponds to the reward structure of the task.  In addition, the influence 
of the match or mismatch will vary by task.  The match states are assumed to increase 
dopamine release into frontal brain areas leading to increased cognitive flexibility 
whereas the mismatch states should not.  In my tasks, cognitive flexibility is defined as a 
persistence to use the explicit processing system in favor of the implicit processing 
system.  This increased cognitive flexibility should lead to better performance on tasks 
that require flexibility, like an explicit rule-based categorization task, and worse 
performance on tasks where flexibility is detrimental, like an implicit categorization task.   
To explore these relationships, my dissertation experiments manipulate 
stereotypes, the task reward structure, and the type of task.  In Experiments 1 and 2, I use 
a category learning task that requires the participant test different explicit rules to 
correctly categorize stimuli.  This task is assumed to require cognitive flexibility.  In 
Experiments 3 and 4, I use a task that requires the implicit learning system and is 
assumed to be disrupted if flexible processing is employed.  In all experiments, half of 
the participants gain points for correct responses while half of the participants lose points 
for correct responses.  I prime a positive or a negative gender stereotype.  The negative 
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prime matches the losses environment while the positive prime matches the gains 
environment.  These matches should lead to better performance in Experiments 1 and 2 
and worse performance in Experiments 3 and 4 because of the increased cognitive 
flexibility afforded by a match.   
To make this argument, in Chapter 2, I describe stereotype threat and previous 
explanations for this phenomenon.  In Chapter 3, I review the literature on regulatory 
focus and demonstrate the cognitive implications of regulatory fit. 
In Chapter 4, I describe experiments that reinterpret stereotype threat effects as a 
four-way regulatory fit interaction.  I used a category learning task that requires the 
participant test different explicit rules to correctly categorize stimuli or a task that 
penalizes participants for persisting with explicit testing in favor of the implicit learning 
system.  This latter task used an information-integration category structure (e.g., Maddox 
& Ashby, 2004).  Importantly, cognitive flexibility will hurt performance using this 
category structure because of a persistence to explicitly test classification rules.  Half of 
the participants gained points for correct responses while half lost points for correct 
responses.  I primed a positive or a negative gender stereotype.  In Experiments 1 and 2, I 
predicted and obtained a 3-way interaction between Stereotype (Positive, Negative), 
Gender (Male, Female), and Reward structure (Gains, Losses) for accuracy and strategy.  
In Experiments 3 and 4, I found data consistent with a 3-way interaction for strategy but 
not accuracy.  My results in Experiment 4 are stronger than my results in Experiment 3. 
In Chapter 5, I reexamine several stereotype threat studies discussed in Chapter 2.  
I consider how the regulatory fit framework would account for the data and what other 
predictions the framework affords.  I highlight how to accommodate other explanations 
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for stereotype threat given my data in Chapter 4.  Further, I discuss some possible neural 
mechanisms responsible for regulatory fit effects and some related individual difference 
variables to be considered in future work.  I end with a discussion of some practical 
implications of my approach and present data from a follow-up experiment using a 
chronic stereotype (e.g., women are bad at math) and GRE math problems.  Participants 
gained or lost points.  I found that women performed better in the losses task than in the 
gains task and men performed better in the gains task than in the losses task.  Thus, I 




Chapter 2: Stereotype Threat 
DEFINITION OF STEREOTYPE THREAT 
Stereotypes are an omnipresent part of human psychological experience.  Even 
the well-educated rely on stereotypes to form impressions of social groups.  For example, 
Lawrence Summers, former President of Harvard, claimed that women are innately 
deficient at mathematics and therefore are less-able scientists.  What psychological 
consequences do women suffer as a result of this negative stereotype?  How does this 
experience generalize to any member of a negatively-stereotyped group? 
Starting with Steele and Aronson (1995), research documents the performance 
decrements resulting from the activation of a negative task-relevant stereotype.  These 
decrements occur in a range of domains from the academic sector to athletic performance 
and are known as stereotype threat effects (Aronson et al., 1999; Spencer, Steele, & 
Quinn, 1999; Steele, 1997; Stone et al., 1999).  Stereotype threat effects are extremely 
common in the literature (Wheeler & Petty, 2001).  In a 2001 review, Wheeler and Petty 
found that 15 of 16 studies manipulating a negative stereotype found behavior consistent 
with the negative stereotype.  These performance decrements are even possible for 
groups typically not stigmatized, like White men (Aronson et al., 1999; Leyens, Desert, 
Croizet, & Darcis, 2000; Stone et al., 1999). 
Not confined to laboratory settings or specific populations as previously thought 
(Whaley, 1998), stereotype threat effects can be found in real-world contexts (Cohen, 
Garcia, Apfel, & Master, 2006; Keller & Dauenheimer, 2003; Steele, James, & Barnett, 
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2002).  Steele, James, and Barnett (2002) demonstrated that women in male-dominated 
fields, such as math and engineering, are more likely than those in female-dominated 
fields to think about changing their major.  They propose that this difference suggests 
women are avoiding the possibility of confirming a negative stereotype by switching into 
fields like the social sciences that do not have negative stereotypes for women (see 
Davies, Spencer, Quinn, & Gerhardstein, 2002 for a laboratory demonstration).   
Similarly, individuals experiencing stereotype threat will avoid confirming group 
membership (McFarland, Lev-Arey, & Ziegert, 2003; Steele & Aronson, 1995) or will 
highlight unique self-characteristics to avoid the threat state (Croizet, Desert, Dutrevis, & 
Leyens, 2001).  In fact, emphasizing intellectual strengths prior to a test framed as 
diagnostic of intellectual abilities increased the performance of women experiencing 
stereotype threat (Croizet et al., 2001). 
STEREOTYPE THREAT EFFECTS 
In the first experiments on this topic, Steele and Aronson (1995) investigated the 
influence of a negative racial stereotype on intellectual performance.  In their studies, 
Black participants underperformed White participants on tests of intellectual ability when 
the test was framed as diagnostic of their ability.  In Experiment 1, Steele and Aronson 
gave their participants a 30-minute test from the Verbal GRE.  In the stereotype threat 
condition the test was described as diagnostic of intellectual ability.  This was thought to 
make the negative stereotype about Black participants’ intellect salient making them 
worried about confirming the stereotype.  In two control conditions, a non-diagnostic 
condition and a challenge condition, the test was described as examining psychological 
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factors involved in verbal problem solving or as difficult for even individuals with 
excellent verbal skills, respectively.  Black participants underperformed relative to White 
participants in the diagnostic condition only.   
This type of paradigm can be applied generally when groups have task-relevant 
negative stereotypes.  Using a clever design, Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling, and Darley (1999) 
examined the performance of Black and White participants in a golf task.  Their 
participants completed a golf course and the number of strokes required to finish the 
course was recorded.  They manipulated the framing of the task between subjects.  The 
task was framed as either diagnostic of “sports intelligence” or “natural athletic ability” 
or “general sports performance.”  Based on culturally-known stereotypes, the sports 
intelligence condition should prime a negative stereotype for the Black participants while 
the natural ability condition should prime a negative stereotype for the White 
participants.  The general sports performance condition acted as a control condition.  
Stone et al. found that Black participants performed worse than the control condition 
when the golf task was framed as diagnostic of “sports intelligence” but better than the 
control if the task was framed as diagnostic of “natural athletic ability.”  In contrast, 
White participants performed worse than control when the task was framed as diagnostic 
of “natural athletic ability.”  
In another domain, Aronson, Lustina, Good, and Keough (1999) examined math 
performance of White men.  Participants in the stereotype threat condition were told that 
the purpose of the study was to examine the mathematical superiority of Asians and were 
asked to read a series of articles on Asians excelling at math.  In the control condition, 
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participants were told nothing.  Aronson et al. found that men in the stereotype threat 
condition scored worse on a math test as compared to men in the control group. 
EXPLANATIONS FOR STEREOTYPE THREAT 
Researchers have manipulated stereotype threat in a number of ways.  The most 
subtle manipulation involves participants merely noting their race on a test form or as 
part of a demographic questionnaire prior to the test (Steele & Aronson, 1995).  Other 
researchers rely on framing the test as diagnostic of ability, where the ability is thought to 
prime a negative stereotype for a particular group.  The strongest manipulation of 
stereotype threat involves telling participants that another group, specifically the 
participants’ out-group, out-performs their in-group. 
So why does stereotype threat occur?  A given stereotype could be self-relevant or 
other-relevant and could be interpreted as positive or negative (Wheeler & Petty, 2001).  
Fundamentally, the psychological environment needs to afford stereotype-consistent 
behavior.  That is, the activated stereotype needs to be self-relevant (Cadinu, Maass, 
Frigerio, Impagliazzo, & Latinotti, 2003; Davies et al., 2002) and the environment needs 
to allow for stereotype confirmation in that the stereotype should be applicable (Ben-
Zeev, Fein, & Inzlicht, 2005; Spencer et al., 1999).  For example, Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev 
(2003) argue that women in mixed-gender environments show more stereotype threat 
consistent behavior than women in same-gender settings.  
Based on the importance and real-world applications of stereotype threat (Keller 
& Dauenheimer, 2003), there have been many posited mechanisms.  For example, 
stereotype threat effects may occur because of too much effort or too little effort, self-
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handicapping, anxiety, or low performance confidence (Cadinu et al., 2003; Smith, 
2004).  For example, Cadinu et al. (2003) argue that stereotype threat effects occur 
because of lower performance expectancies.  That is, the lower the expected level of 
performance, the lower the actual performance.   As another example, Schmader, Johns, 
and Barquissau (2004) provide behavioral data differentiating individuals based on 
stereotype endorsement.  In two studies, they compared a control group of women with 
women who endorsed the stereotype that men are better at math than women.  Stereotype 
endorsement led to decreased confidence in learning new material, lower domain self-
esteem, less desire to continue on in related careers, and poorer performance on a math 
test.   
Brown and Josephs (1999) demonstrate that math performance differences can be 
attributed to task-specific concerns.  They predicted and obtained support for the claim 
that women are concerned with confirming a negative stereotype while men are 
concerned with confirming a positive stereotype.  In a clever design, Brown and Josephs 
framed their test as diagnostic of weak ability or strong ability.  Women underperformed 
in the weak ability condition relative to women in the strong ability condition and men 
showed the reverse effect.   
Ideomotor theorists argue that stereotype threat effects occur because of a 
connection between the represented stereotype and the corresponding stereotypic 
behavior (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Wheeler & Petty, 2001).  That is, activation of 
the stereotype activates stereotype-consistent behavior.  For example, Bargh et al. 
demonstrate that priming an elderly stereotype caused participants to walk more slowly 
down a hallway than unprimed participants.   
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While interesting, this theory may be unable to explain stereotype lift effects 
documented by Walton and Cohen  (2003).  Stereotype lift occurs when individuals in the 
non-stereotyped group show an increase in their performance relative to control 
participants.  If the stereotype threat mechanism involved direct activation of stereotypic 
behaviors given the activation of a stereotype, the stereotype does not need to be self-
relevant to influence performance.  Given that both negative and positive stereotypes tend 
to be primed, all participants should have all stereotypic behaviors activated.  At a 
minimum, ideomotor theories need to explain the selection of stereotype-consistent 
behaviors and as such seem to gain little ground as compared to other relevance-related 
theories.   
There are a couple different motivational accounts of stereotype threat.  First, 
stereotype threat is conceptualized as activation and inhibition of specific stereotypes 
based on active goals (Fein, von Hippel, & Spencer, 1999; Sinclair & Kunda, 1999).  For 
example, Sinclair and Kunda (1999) gave participants positive or negative task feedback 
from a Black ‘doctor’.  Given positive feedback, participants more quickly identified 
words associated with a doctor stereotype but given negative feedback participants more 
quickly identified words associated with a Black stereotype.  This demonstrates that a 
desire to view an individual in a specific way can interact with the activated stereotypic 
information.  However, as Fein et al. (1999) note, based on the wealth of other data it 
seems unlikely that this mechanism accounts for the effects.  People often seem unable to 
inhibit negative stereotypes, even given an active desire, and thus show the corresponding 
performance decrements. 
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Second, arousal theorists (see Brehm & Self, 1989 for a general discussion on the 
role of arousal) believe that stereotype threat increases system arousal affecting 
performance on difficult but not on easy tasks (Ben-Zeev et al., 2005; O'Brien & 
Crandall, 2003).  From a stereotype threat framework, Wheeler and Petty (2001) argue 
that stereotypes are more relevant for difficult tasks as compared to easy tasks.  However, 
arousal theorists argue that tasks do not need to be stereotype-relevant because an 
increase in arousal should influence general task performance.  For example, Ben-Zeev et 
al. tested women on an easy writing task in which they wrote their name in cursive for 20 
seconds and on a difficult writing task in which they wrote their name backwards for 20 
seconds.  Participants primed with a negative math stereotype underperformed control 
participants in the difficult task but outperformed the control in the easy task. 
Further evidence comes from work on eradicating stereotype threat by providing 
obvious situational attributions for performance decrements (Brown & Josephs, 1999; 
Johns, Schmader, & Martens, 2005) or reducing anxiety (Cohen et al., 2006).  For 
example, Brown and Josephs (1999) examined the influence of providing an external 
handicap.  In Study 2, half of the participants were told that they could not complete 
practice math problems prior to a test because of computer failure.  Women in this 
condition performed better as compared to control women.  Using a more direct 
manipulation, Johns et al. (2005) taught a group of women about stereotype threat and 
found that math performance increased for this group.  In a similar study, Cohen, Garcia, 
Apfel, and Master (2006) improved performance by African American students by 
reducing stress using self-affirmation techniques. 
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A more parsimonious account of these arousal effects comes from the working 
memory literature (Beilock, Jellison, Rydell, McConnell, & Carr, 2006; Schmader & 
Johns, 2003).  Schmader and Johns (2003) recently argued that stereotype threat effects 
are mediated by working memory capacity.  Beilock, Jellison, Rydell, McConnell, and 
Carr (2006) extend this idea and demonstrate the working memory impairment is caused 
by explicit monitoring of performance for tasks that have been proceduralized (also see 
Cadinu et al., 2003 for an earlier discussion of the role of divided attention).  They used 
golf experts and a putting task.  For these participants, putting should be an automatized 
skill.  Beilock et al. induced stereotype threat by telling half of their male participants that 
women tend to perform better on the putting task.  As compared to a control group, these 
men performed worse.  Interestingly, this performance decrement was eliminated in 
Experiments 2 and 3 by giving participants a dual task to perform.  This result is nicely 
consistent with Beilock and colleagues previous work on “choking under pressure” 
(Beilock & Carr, 2005; Beilock, Kulp, Holt, & Carr, 2004) in which induced pressure 
resulted in explicit monitoring of performance, and previous demonstrations of the role of 
negative thinking under stereotype threat (Cadinu, Maass, Rosabianca, & Kiesner, 2005).   
Most relevant to my Experiments, Seibt and Förster (2004) argue that activating 
stereotypes induces regulatory foci, which in turn influence performance.  Seibt and 
Förster demonstrate that a negative stereotype induces a prevention focus while a positive 
stereotype induces a promotion focus.  In order to evaluate this claim, I turn now to an 
overview of Regulatory Focus Theory. 
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Chapter 3:  Regulatory-Focus Theory 
DEFINITION OF REGULATORY FOCUS 
Regulatory focus is a construct from social psychology developed by Higgins and 
his colleagues (Higgins, 1987, 1997a).  Higgins suggests motivational states differ across 
individuals.  Although philosophers and psychologists previously recognized that people 
seek pleasure and avoid pain, Higgins contributed by asking the source of these hedonic 
motives.  How exactly are people acting in concert with the hedonic or pleasure 
principle?  What are the mechanisms? 
 Higgins proposes that regulatory focus is a motivational mechanism that 
influences people’s sensitivity to potential gains and losses in their environment (Higgins, 
1987, 1997a).  The motivation literature has long made a distinction between approach 
states (those that are desirable) and avoidance states (those that are undesirable) (see 
Carver & Scheier, 1990; Markman & Brendl, 2000; Miller, 1959 for further discussion).   
These approach and avoidance mechanisms underlie the hedonic principle and are self-
regulatory strategies that focus people toward desired end states.  Importantly, 
individuals can be striving to achieve different end states, which represent different 
needs:  nurturance or security (Higgins, 1997a; Shah & Higgins, 1997; Shah, Higgins, & 
Friedman, 1998).  For nurturance needs, the individual is seeking some positive state and 
for security needs, the individual is trying to avoid some negative state.  Therefore, 
approach and avoidance strategies are associated with approaching desirable end states 
and avoiding undesirable end states, respectively.   
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Orthogonal to this distinction, Higgins (1987; 1997a) argues that individuals may 
differ in their relative attention to gains or losses in the environment.  A focus on the 
presence or absence of gains is called a promotion focus, and a focus on the presence or 
absence of losses is called a prevention focus.  For example, an individual with a 
promotion focus might be concerned with earning an A on an exam by earning enough 
points while an individual with a prevention focus might be concerned with preventing a 
B on an exam by losing too many points.  In this example, a promotion-focused 
individual who successfully earns an A has the same outcome as a prevention-focused 
individual who successfully avoids earning a B.  According to Higgins, when an 
individual decides to pursue a goal, they do so with a particular motivational orientation 
determined by stable personality characteristics and this focus guides their processing.  
However, while people differ in the chronic accessibility of these foci, often 
situations that have salient potential gains or losses may induce a regulatory focus that 
overrides a person’s chronic focus (Higgins, 2000b; Shah et al., 1998).  For example, 
comments from a parent or experimental task instructions that frame the situation using 
gains or losses (e.g., Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998) may be sufficient to induce a 
regulatory focus.  Furthermore, some of the hallmarks of the regulatory foci can be used 
to induce a specific focus by activating security or nurturance needs (e.g., Friedman & 
Forster, 2001) or priming a self standard (e.g., Freitas, Liberman, & Higgins, 2002; 
Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994).  For example, Higgins et al. (1994) 
demonstrate that asking individuals to think about their goals or ideals places them into a 
promotion focus whereas asking individuals to think about their responsibilities places 
them into a prevention focus. 
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As first outlined in self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987), ideals represent 
possible positive end states approached when in a promotion focus while responsibilities 
represent possible negative end states to be avoided when in a prevention focus (Higgins, 
1997b).  These goal differences have been exploited to create measures of chronic and 
situationally-induced foci.  Theoretically, the presence of a promotion focus makes the 
discrepancies between the ideal self and the actual self more accessible while a 
prevention focus makes the discrepancies between the ought self and the actual self more 
accessible (Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997).  Measures of chronic focus, such as the 
Selves Questionnaire (Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1985) or the Regulatory Focus 
Questionnaire (Higgins et al., 2001), can be used to determine the discrepancies between 
actual, ideal, and ought selves, while other procedures rely on the speed of accepting or 
rejecting self statements (Shah et al., 1998) or the endorsement of specific self statements 
(Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002), such as “I often worry that I will fail to accomplish 
my academic goals.” 
EFFECTS OF REGULATORY FOCI 
The implications of maintaining either a promotion or a prevention focus are 
numerous.  Early research on regulatory focus examined differences in emotions and 
cognitive processes associated with promotion and prevention foci (e.g., Forster & 
Higgins, 2005; Higgins, 1997a).  There are different affective experiences which result 
from successful or unsuccessful approach and avoidance (Higgins, 1997a).  A promotion 
focus induces an attempt to approach positive end states.  If an end state is achieved, the 
individual will feel happiness whereas failure will lead to sadness.  In contrast, a 
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prevention focus induces an attempt to avoid negative end states.  If an end state is 
successfully avoided, the individual is likely to feel relief whereas failures to avoid the 
end state will likely result in anxiety.    
Förster and Higgins (2005) argue that a promotion focus supports more global 
processing while a prevention focus supports more local processing.  Evidence for this 
claim comes from embedded figures tests (Forster & Higgins, 2005), tests of creative 
performance (Friedman & Forster, 2001), preferences for stability and change (Liberman, 
Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999b), hypothesis generation (Liberman, Molden, Idson, & 
Higgins, 2001), and probability estimates for conjunctive and disjunctive events 
(Brockner, Paruchuri, Idson, & Higgins, 2002).  For example, Friedman and Förster 
(2001) motivated this prediction by assuming that security related concerns associated 
with a prevention focus historically required the individual to focus more on specific 
aspects of their local surroundings.  A promotion focus does not require this attention to 
detail.  They suggest that this fundamental difference evolved into different processing 
styles induced by regulatory foci.  Being in a particular focus promotes a scanning of the 
environment to find things which are consistent with goal strivings to increase the 
likelihood of goal attainment.  A prevention focus supports attention to more concrete 
details while a promotion focus supports attention to more ideal and more abstract 
elements. 
In Experiments 1 and 2, their participants completed a maze task that involved 
either a mouse trying to get to a piece of Swiss cheese (promotion) or a mouse trying to 
avoid being eaten by an owl (prevention).  These mazes served to induce either a 
promotion or a prevention focus.  In Experiment 1, promotion-primed participants 
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identified more embedded images in a task that required them to extract simple images 
masked with visual noise as compared to prevention-primed participants.  In a better test 
of creative performance, in Experiment 2, promotion-primed participants generated more 
creative uses for a brick as compared to prevention-primed participants.  These results 
were replicated with a different test of creative performance using chronic focus in 
Experiment 5. 
Based on their results from Experiments 3 and 4, they believe enhanced creativity 
is the result of a more risky response bias.  Higher risk should be associated with 
guaranteeing hits and ensuring against errors of omission whereas a more conservative 
strategy would be associated with a focus on correct rejections and errors of commission.  
In Experiment 3, participants were told that if they performed well they would get to do a 
pleasant task (promotion focus) or were told that by not performing poorly they would 
not have to do an unpleasant task (prevention focus).  As predicted, promotion-focused 
individuals were more biased to say “yes” in a recognition memory task whereas 
prevention-focused individuals were more biased to say “no”.   
The results of Experiment 4 are more intriguing.  They use a word-fragment 
completion task and have participants complete the task twice.  Promotion-primed 
participants generated more novel solutions to the second task than prevention-primed 
participants.  They argue that promotion helps mitigate the effects of retrieval inhibition 
and suggest that promotion should also improve performance in functional fixedness and 
tip-of-the-tongue states.  In essence, a promotion focus promotes a more elaborative 
processing style that reduces perseveration on already generated solutions. 
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Similarly, in Förster and Higgins (2005), participants completed an embedded 
figures task in which larger letters were composed of smaller component ones.  For 
example, a large letter H would be constructed with small Ts.  Participants responded to 
both global and local letters on different trials and their chronic levels of promotion and 
prevention were measured.  Consistent with their predictions, Förster and Higgins found 
that promotion-focused participants responded more quickly to global letters whereas 
prevention-focused participants responded more quickly to local letters. 
REGULATORY FIT 
More recent work on regulatory focus examines how a person’s regulatory focus 
typically interacts with salient aspects of the task to determine the cognitive and 
evaluative processes that are brought to bear on performance (Higgins, 2005; Higgins, 
Idson, Freitas, Spiegel, & Molden, 2003; Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2004; Keller & 
Bless, 2006; Lee & Aaker, 2004; Maddox et al., 2006; Maddox et al., 2007; Markman, 
Baldwin et al., 2005; Shah et al., 1998).  For example, Higgins and colleagues found that 
the value people give items in the environment depends on the fit between a person’s 
regulatory focus and aspects of the items being evaluated (Camacho, Higgins, & Luger, 
2003; Higgins, 2000a; Shah et al., 1998).  This correspondence between focus and the 
environment is known as regulatory fit.    
A regulatory fit exists when there is a match between the focus and a 
corresponding state (Higgins, 1997b).  A regulatory match could be present when the 
desired goal matches the possible outcome state, when there is a match between the focus 
and the strategies used to pursue a goal (Higgins, 2000a), and when there is a match 
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between the focus and the strategy afforded by the environment (Keller & Bless, 2006; 
Shah et al., 1998).  It is also possible to get a match between situational focus or chronic 
focus and specific motor actions related to approaching positive stimuli or avoiding 
negative stimuli (Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Forster, Higgins, & Idson, 1998).   
Another form of fit exists when a person’s regulatory focus matches the reward 
structure of the task they are performing (Keller & Bless, 2006; Maddox et al., 2006; 
Shah et al., 1998).  A promotion focus increases people’s sensitivity to gains and 
nongains, and so there is a regulatory match between individuals with a promotion focus 
and tasks in which people gain rewards (e.g., points in a task), but a regulatory mismatch 
for those participants when they must avoid punishments (e.g., losing points).  In 
contrast, a prevention focus increases people’s sensitivity to losses and so there is a 
regulatory match between individuals with a prevention focus and tasks for which they 
must avoid losses, but a regulatory mismatch for those participants in tasks for which 
they must achieve gains.   
So what are some of the cognitive and evaluative processes that vary with 
regulatory fit?  Given a match, Higgins argues individuals experience their goal strivings 
more strongly and feel more positively about their reactions.  He argues that a regulatory 
fit enhances task engagement, which increases the perceived value of the task (Higgins, 
2000a).  Simply, match states feel better than mismatch states (Aaker & Lee, 2006; 
Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004; Kruglanski, 2006; Sassenberg, Jonas, Shah, & Brazy, 
2007).  For example, Higgins, Idson, Freitas, Spiegel, and Molden (2003) argue that a fit 
between strategy and focus makes people feel good about the decisions that they make 
(see also Avnet & Higgins, 2006; Idson et al., 2004).  They asked participants to think 
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about a choice between a mug and a pen.  Half of the participants were instructed to think 
about what they would gain from the choice and the other half considered what they 
would lose from the choice.  Participants then assigned a price to the mug.  Participants 
assigned a higher price when the task instructions matched their chronic focus.  That is, 
prevention-focused individuals assigned a higher price given the losses instructions as 
compared to the gains instructions whereas the opposite was true for promotion-focused 
individuals.   
This result has been replicated by Förster and Higgins (2005) by priming 
participants with a local or global processing style.  In this study, global-primed 
participants assigned a higher value to the mug given the gains task as compared to the 
losses task whereas the local-primed participants assigned a higher value to the mug 
given the losses task as compared to the gains task.  Furthermore, there was a main effect 
of processing in that the global-primed participants assigned higher values than the local-
primed participants.   
Individuals also make qualitatively different decisions given a regulatory match 
(Lee & Aaker, 2004).  For example, in Experiments 1 and 5, Lee and Aaker showed 
participants messages that were either gain-framed or loss-framed after situationally 
manipulating their focus and argued that a fit between the message frame and the 
situational focus resulted in the message appearing more persuasive.  The situational 
focus manipulation involved reading a passage that described grape juice as an energy 
drink (promotion) or as a way to prevent cancer and heart disease (prevention).  The 
message frame consisted of a positive or negative tagline associated with the passage.  
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For example, the promotion passage taglines were “Get Energized” and “Don’t Miss Out 
on Getting Energized” for the gains and losses, respectively.   
Lee and Aaker interpret their effects as the result of a fit “feeling right” and 
therefore processing feels easier and more fluent.  Lee and Aaker (2004, Experiment 4A) 
demonstrate that people rate the information in a passage as being easier to process when 
they are in a regulatory match produced by situational focus and message framing as 
compared to those in a regulatory mismatch.  This effect persists using a more implicit 
measure of processing fluency in their Experiment 4B.   
In addition, individuals seek role-models that match their regulatory focus 
concerns (Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002), such that promotion individuals are more 
motivated by positive role models and prevention individuals are more motivated by 
negative role models who inspire fear by representing the to-be-avoided self.  Lockwood 
et al. (2002) demonstrate that individuals primed with a promotion focus respond with 
higher levels of motivation when presented with a positive role model who activates 
approach strategies as compared to a negative role model who activates avoidance 
strategies.  However, the opposite is true for prevention-primed participants.  They argue 
the greatest motivational benefits are possible when individuals are presented with role 
models that match their underlying motivational focus. 
Other studies have demonstrated improved task performance from regulatory fit 
(Keller & Bless, 2006; Shah et al., 1998; Spiegel, Grant-Pillow, & Higgins, 2004).  
Spiegel et al. (2004) required participants to read a health message about eating fruits and 
vegetables framed as either promotion or prevention.  Half of the participants listed 
benefits of eating fruits and vegetables and half listed costs.  Spiegel et al. demonstrated 
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that the match conditions (promotion/benefits and prevention/costs) ate more fruits and 
vegetables over the following week than the mismatch conditions (promotion/costs and 
prevention/benefits).   
Keller and Bless (2006) demonstrated that matching the chronic focus of the 
individual and the situational focus improves cognitive performance for both 
mathematical and spatial tests in a real-world context.  They used secondary school 
students in grades 6 and 8 and measured chronic focus using a modified version of the 
Selves Questionnaire (Higgins et al., 1985) in Experiment 1 and the scale developed by 
Lockwood et al. (2002) in Experiment 2.  In Experiment 1, Keller and Bless manipulated 
situational focus by telling promotion participants that the test was designed to identify 
people with exceptional ability but not weak ability.  In contrast, the prevention 
participants were told that the test was designed with the reverse goal in mind.  As 
predicted, they found that participants got more correct on the math test when their 
chronic focus matched the situational manipulation as compared to when their chronic 
focus did not match the situational manipulation.  In Experiment 2, a situational-
promotion focus was created by telling participants that they would gain one point for 
each correct response but gain no points for incorrect responses.  For the situational-
prevention focus condition, participants received a point for a correct response but lost a 
point for each incorrect or uncompleted response.  Like Experiment 1, the match 
conditions produced better test performance as compared to the mismatch conditions.  Of 
note, the situational-prevention focus condition is not a true losses task (for a better 
demonstration, see Maddox, Baldwin, Markman, 2006). 
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As another example, Shah, Higgins, and Friedman (1998) manipulated the task 
reward structure in both Experiments 1 and 2.  Promotion focus participants were told 
that they could earn an extra dollar for good performance (e.g., 90% correct) while 
prevention focus participants started with the extra dollar and were told that they could 
lose the extra dollar or not based on their performance (e.g., miss no more than 10%).  
They also measured chronic focus using a modification of the Selves Questionnaire 
(Higgins et al., 1985) which recorded the accessibility of the attributes using response 
time.  Their participants completed an anagram task that required them to unscramble 
letters to form words.  
In Experiment 1, they found that the ideal self ratings better predicted anagram 
task performance given the promotion framing as compared to prevention framing 
whereas the ought self ratings better predicted performance as compared to ideal ratings 
given the prevention framing.  Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 with a slight change 
to the anagram task.  Some anagrams had the possibility of gaining points while others 
had the possibility of losing points.  First, with respect to the original design, Experiment 
2 replicated Experiment 1.  Second, ideal ratings better predicted performance in the 
promotion and gains task as compared to the other tasks (e.g., prevention and gains, 
prevention and losses, and promotion and losses) and ought ratings better predicted 
performance in the prevention and losses task as compared to the other tasks.  Shah et al. 
argue this result supports the claim that different foci are consistent with different means 
of goal attainment.  The promotion participants focused more on the dual gains frame 
(extra money and points possible) whereas the prevention participants focused more on 
the dual losses frame (loss of money and points possible). 
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A number of recent studies have demonstrated that participants with a regulatory 
fit are able to perform more flexibly in cognitive tasks than are participants with a 
regulatory mismatch, regardless of whether that fit comes from having a promotion focus 
and a task with a gains reward structure or a prevention focus with a losses reward 
structure (Grimm, Markman, Maddox, & Baldwin, in press; Maddox et al., 2006; 
Maddox et al., 2007; Markman, Baldwin et al., 2005; Markman, Maddox et al., 2005; 
Markman et al., 2006).  I describe one example of this effect of regulatory fit in detail, 
because the experiments I present in this dissertation are based on this example (Maddox 
et al., 2006).   
Some participants were given a situational promotion focus by giving them the 
opportunity to obtain a raffle ticket for a drawing to win $50 if their performance 
exceeded a criterion.  Other participants were given a situational prevention focus by 
giving them a raffle ticket for this drawing and telling them that they could keep the 
ticket as long as their performance exceeded the criterion, otherwise, they would lose it. 
This is a variation of a manipulation first presented by Higgins and colleagues (Higgins, 
1997a; Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999a).  The reward structure of the 
classification task was manipulated between subjects as well.  Participants given a gains 
reward structure received points for every response, but got more points for correct 
responses than for incorrect responses.  Participants given a losses reward structure lost 
points for every response, but lost fewer points for correct responses than for incorrect 
responses.   
In Experiments 1a and 1b, participants were given a perceptual classification task 
in which they had to learn to classify lines that varied in their length, position, and 
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orientation.  The task required learning a subtle classification rule involving the length 
and orientation dimensions.  A simple rule involving only the highly salient position 
dimension would yield good performance, but not sufficiently good performance to 
achieve the performance criterion.   
The lines can be correctly classified using an explicit verbalizable rule.  Simply 
stated, lines are in Category A if the length is long and the orientation is steep and 
otherwise the lines are in Category B (see Figure 3.1).   
 
 
Figure 3.1.   Stimulus space with correct conjunctive rule on length and orientation 
dimensions represented. 
 
Using this rule, a participant can get 100% accuracy on the task.  However, given that 
there are easier verbalizable rules using any of the dimensions independently, a 
participant needs to move from using one of these unidimensional rules, each of which 
yields at most 83% accuracy on the task, to the more complex conjunctive rule using 
length and orientation.  Thus, this task requires flexibility because it forces participants to 
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search the possible strategy space to find a less obvious but more effective strategy for 
classifying the items.   
In Experiment 1A, participants gained points on every trial.  Based on the 
sensitivity produced by a promotion focus to gains and non-gains in the environment, the 
promotion-primed participants are experiencing a regulatory match in this task 
environment whereas the prevention-primed participants are experiencing a regulatory 
mismatch.  In Experiment 1B, participants lost points on every trial.  Again, as suggested 
by work on regulatory focus, the prevention-primed participants are now experiencing a 
regulatory match while promotion-primed participants are experiencing a regulatory 
mismatch.  Participants with a regulatory match (e.g., promotion focus with gains or 
prevention focus with losses) performed better and were more likely to achieve the 
performance criterion than were participants with a regulatory mismatch (e.g., prevention 
focus with gains or promotion focus with losses).   
One advantage of using this classification task is that it is possible to fit 
mathematical models to the data to describe the performance of individual participants on 
a block-by-block basis.  Maddox, Baldwin, and Markman (2006) found that early in 
learning, people’s performance was best characterized as using a simple rule along one 
dimension.  Later, they learned to classify on the basis of the correct two-dimensional 
rule.  Participants with a regulatory fit found that two-dimensional rule earlier in the task 
than did those with a regulatory mismatch. 
In Experiment 3, the classification task used an information-integration category 
structure (e.g., Maddox & Ashby, 2004) and a losses reward structure.  Participants were 
primed with a situational focus using the same manipulation described above.  The 
29 
stimulus dimensions used for this task were length, orientation and position, as in 
Experiments 1 and 2, but correct classification required participants learn a rule that is 
not easily verbalizable (see Figure 3.2). 
 
 
Figure 3.2.   Stimulus space with correct information-integration rule on length and 
orientation dimensions represented. 
 
The optimal information-integration rule allows for perfect performance on the task while 
a unidimensional rule at best allows for 83% accuracy.  They argued that task 
performance would be hurt by flexible processing.  Performing well on this task requires 
that the participant abandon the explicit rule-based testing system in favor of the implicit 
learning system.  As such, they predicted and obtained support for the claim that 
participants experiencing a regulatory match would perform more poorly on the task than 
participants experiencing a regulatory mismatch. 
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Chapter 4:  Experiments 
There are several reasons to believe stereotype threat and regulatory focus are 
related phenomena.  Work has explicitly linked stereotype threat effects with regulatory 
focus (Forster, Higgins, & Strack, 2000; Keller & Dauenheimer, 2003; Seibt & Forster, 
2004) by examining the role of regulatory focus in the processing of stereotypic 
information (Forster et al., 2000) and by studying the mediation of stereotype threat by 
emotions induced by regulatory focus states (Keller & Dauenheimer, 2003).  Further, a 
study on regulatory focus (Keller & Bless, 2006) and a study examining stereotype threat 
(Brown & Josephs, 1999) use the same manipulation.  Brown and Josephs manipulate 
stereotype threat by framing a test as diagnostic of weak or strong ability.  They argue 
that the weak ability condition corresponds to the negative stereotype women desire to 
avoid confirming and the strong ability condition corresponds to the positive stereotype 
that men desire to confirm.  Likewise, Keller and Bless manipulate situational focus 
using the same test framing.  However, they argue that the weak ability condition primed 
a situational-prevention focus and the strong ability condition primed a situational-
promotion focus. 
Förster et al. (2000) examined the influence of regulatory focus on the processing 
of stereotypic information.  Their correlational study revealed that the higher participants’ 
scores in modern sexism and in prevention the more they recalled stereotype-incongruent 
information.  In contrast, the higher participants’ score in promotion the more they 
recalled stereotype-congruent information.  Theoretically, these relationships were 
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predicted because the more vigilant processing style associated with a prevention focus 
causes individuals to seek disconfirming information.  It is less clear why higher 
promotion resulted in more recall of congruent information.   
In another important demonstration, Keller and Dauenheimer (2003) recognized 
the interaction between stereotype threat and situationally-induced regulatory focus.  
They predicted that affective reactions to stereotype threat are mediated by situationally-
induced focus.  To induce a promotion focus, they told all students to try to solve as 
many math problems as possible.  Half of the students were given a gender stereotype 
manipulation: “The following math test…has been shown to produce gender differences 
in the past.”  Keller and Dauenheimer assumed this primed girls with a negative 
stereotype and boys with a positive stereotype.  While working on the math problems, 
students rated the degree to which they were experiencing emotions related to promotion 
and prevention foci: tense, nervous, anxious, depressed, uncertain, agitated, calm, self-
conscious, quiet and unconcerned were prevention emotions, and disappointed, 
frustrated, sad, contented, enthusiastic, light-hearted, happy, and balanced were the 
promotion emotions.  Keller and Dauenheimer found that girls underperformed in the 
stereotype threat condition as compared to boys, and boys and girls in the control 
condition.  Examining only the girls, dejection (a combination of disappointed, frustrated, 
and sad) served as a mediator of performance.  They argued that this result shows 
situational promotion influencing the emotions experienced in stereotype threat. 
In 2004, Seibt and Förster advanced an insightful proposal that differences in 
regulatory focus are in fact the cause of stereotype threat effects.  In a series of 
experiments, they demonstrate that priming individuals with a negative stereotype 
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induces a prevention focus while priming individuals with a positive stereotype induces a 
promotion focus.  They argue that the induced regulatory focus produces differential 
performance on tasks for which elaborative processing is required:  a positive stereotype 
supports more global/elaborative processing because of the induced promotion focus 
while a negative stereotype supports more local processing because of the induced 
prevention focus.  In Experiment 2, they test for this performance difference by 
examining speed/accuracy tradeoffs.  They assume that individuals given a positive 
stereotype should be faster and make more errors.  In contrast, individuals given a 
negative stereotype should be slower and make fewer errors due to the use of a more 
vigilant processing style.  As predicted, they found faster performance for the positive-
stereotype group relative to the control and slower performance for the negative-
stereotype group relative to the control.  In addition, they found the opposite pattern for 
errors. 
In my view, Seibt and Förster (2004) correctly argue that activating stereotypes 
induces regulatory foci, which in turn influence performance.  They demonstrate that a 
negative stereotype induces a prevention focus while a positive stereotype induces a 
promotion focus.  Based on Friedman and Förster (2001), they assume that a prevention 
focus causes individuals to pay more attention to details and be more vigilant whereas a 
promotion focus causes individuals to engage in more abstract creative processing.   
The critical question is why did Seibt and Förster find these speed/accuracy 
differences between their focus groups?  Is it true that a prevention focus always results 
in more detail-oriented processing and higher accuracy on tasks that require less 
33 
elaborative processing?  I believe that the answer depends on the reward structure of the 
task. 
As argued by Markman, Maddox and colleagues, understanding the influence of 
the reward structure of the task is a critical part of untangling the effects of regulatory 
focus.  Most laboratory experiments, explicitly or implicitly, involve a gains and non-
gains environment.  Participants are trying to get the most answers correct or are trying to 
get the most points.  In the most abstract sense, undergraduate participants may be trying 
to earn course credit by participating while others may be trying to get paid for 
participation.  Much of the prior work on regulatory focus and all of the work cited above 
examining the influence of regulatory focus on stereotype threat fails to consider the 
importance of the interaction of regulatory focus with this type of task environment. 
While making an excellent observation linking stereotypes with induced-
regulatory foci, Seibt and Förster (2004) fail to consider the influence of task reward 
structure and therefore miss a critical part of the explanation.  Let us assume that their 
participants were functioning in a gains and non-gains environment.  This would result in 
their promotion-focused participants being in a regulatory match.  That is, their focus 
matches the task environment.  In contrast, their prevention-focused participants would 
be in a regulatory mismatch.   
I suggest that the differences in regulatory fit actually are responsible for 
producing their effects.  Based on the work by Maddox, Baldwin, and Markman (2006), I 
argue that a regulatory fit produces flexible cognitive performance.  Critically, flexible 
abstract processing is a hallmark of a regulatory match, not of a promotion focus, just as 
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detailed local processing is a hallmark of a regulatory mismatch, not of a prevention 
focus.   
Table 4.1 summarizes the interaction between regulatory focus and task reward 
structure.  My argument is that previous demonstrations of stereotype threat have 
assessed the left-hand column of this table.  Typical cognitive tasks involve an explicit or 
implicit gain structure.  Participants are trying to achieve correct answers to questions and 
are typically rewarded for being correct.  Participants who have a negative task-relevant 
stereotype have a prevention focus, and thus are in a regulatory mismatch.  Further, the 
majority of tasks, like math problems and verbal reasoning, tend to require flexible 
processing.  Because the tasks are difficult, this mismatch leads to poorer performance 
than is observed in participants who do not have a negative task-relevant stereotype.  This 
latter group either has a positive task-relevant stereotype, in which case they likely have a 
promotion focus, or else they have no task-relevant stereotype in which case their 
performance will be driven in part by their chronically accessible regulatory focus. 
My analysis suggests that if I assessed the performance of participants in a loss 
condition (the rightmost column of Table 4.1), then the effects of having a negative task-
relevant stereotype should reverse.  That is, participants with a negative task-relevant 
stereotype should actually do better when there is a loss reward structure than should 


















Table 4.1.   Schematic representation of regulatory matches and mismatches 
 
I present the following experiments to support my claim that the processing 
strategies differentially employed by induced promotion and prevention are the result of 
the interaction between task reward structure and regulatory focus instead of a main 
effect of promotion and prevention.  Importantly, this suggests that classic stereotype 
threat effects are the result of a regulatory mismatch.  The activation of a negative 
stereotype produces prevention-primed participants who are likely acting in a gains and 
non-gains environment, which results in a regulatory mismatch.  These participants 
would then underperform on tasks requiring flexible processing. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL OVERVIEW 
According to the COmpetion between Verbal and Implicit Systems (COVIS) 
model of multiple memory systems (Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998; 
Ashby & Waldron, 1999), one memory system involves an explicit rule-based processor 
that provides the means to test different explicit hypotheses while another competing 
system is an implicit procedural learning system.  The explicit system is believed to take 
place in frontal brain regions which are used for flexible processing while the procedural 
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system is believed to be instantiated in sub-cortical areas, such as the tail of the caudate 
nucleus (Maddox & Ashby, 2004).  Experiments 1 and 2 use a rule-based classification 
task, which requires the participant use rule-based strategies to explicitly test different 
rules to correctly categorize the stimuli.  Arthur B. Markman, W. Todd Maddox, and 
Grant C. Baldwin collaborated on these experiments.  The task requires cognitive 
flexibility because participants need to discard easy to find unidimensional classification 
rules in favor of a more complicated conjunctive classification rule that requires the use 
of two stimulus dimensions.  Experiments 3 and 4 use an information-integration 
category structure that needs to be learned by the procedural learning system.  For this 
category structure, persistence with flexible rule testing using the explicit system would 
hurt performance. 
 
EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2:  RULE-BASED TASK 
In these studies, we selected the rule-based classification task used by Maddox, 
Baldwin, & Markman (2006) described above.  Because this task involves the 
classification of lines, we could create arbitrary stereotypes and present them to 
participants.  Thus, in Experiment 1, we told male and female participants that this task is 
one for which women have previously been demonstrated to do better than men.  In 
Experiment 2, we presented participants with the opposite story, so participants were told 
that men perform better than women on this task.  In both studies, the negative task-
relevant stereotype was expected to create a prevention focus, and the positive task-
relevant stereotype was expected to create a promotion focus.  Participants were then 
given the classification task with a gains or a losses reward structure.  Thus, participants 
with a negative task-relevant stereotype have a regulatory fit when the task has a losses 
reward structure, and so they should perform better than when the task has a gains reward 
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structure and they have a mismatch.  In contrast, participants with a positive task-relevant 
stereotype should have a regulatory fit for the gains reward structure, and thus should 
perform better than when they perform the task with a losses reward structure and have a 
regulatory mismatch.  After the presentation of the two experiments, I fit classification 
models to participants’ performance to examine how rule-use changes over the course of 
the studies.  The structure of Experiments 1 and 2 appears in Table 4.2. 
 
Experiment Stereotype Gender Gains Losses 
Positive 
(“Promotion”) 




Men Mismatch Match 
Positive 
(“Promotion”) 




Women Match Mismatch 
Table 4.2.   Structure of Experiments 1 and 2 
Based on the work by Maddox, Markman, and colleagues, the match condition 
participants should engage in more flexible processing leading to better performance in 
the classification task as compared to the mismatch conditions.  Critically, I will show 
that a promotion focus induced by a positive stereotype will not always lead to more 
flexible processing.  Instead, an induced promotion focus will only lead to flexible 
processing in the gains task.  Likewise, I will demonstrate that an induced prevention 
focus will lead to more flexible processing in the losses task.  I will replicate stereotype 
threat effects but only in the gains task.  I predict a negative stereotype will lead to poorer 
performance because of the presence of a regulatory mismatch.  In sum, given that this 
task requires flexible processing, the match conditions should outperform the mismatch 
conditions. 
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These predictions are also supported by some prior work on stereotype threat 
(Quinn & Spencer, 2001; Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999; Walton & Cohen, 2003; 
Wraga, Helt, Duncan, & Jacobs, 2006).  First, Wraga et al. (2006), Walton and Cohen 
(2003), and Shih et al. (1999) present evidence for improved performance by groups with 
positive stereotypes.  Walton and Cohen label this phenomena stereotype lift.  In a meta-
analytic review of 43 studies, they found improved performance by the non-negatively 
stereotyped group in the stereotype-relevant condition as compared to the stereotype-
irrelevant or control condition.   
Second, Quinn and Spencer (2001) find reduced strategy use given stereotype 
threat.  In their study, women and men completed a series of math problems from the 
SAT while verbalizing their thought processes.  Women were primed with a negative 
stereotype.  Quinn and Spencer coded the number of problem solving strategies used by 
participants.  They found women in the stereotype threat condition failed to find any 
strategy 14% of the time as compared to 2% in the control condition.  This finding maps 
directly to our claim that participants in a regulatory mismatch (i.e., negative stereotype 
in a gains task) will display less flexible processing as compared to participants in a 
regulatory match (i.e., positive/neutral stereotype in a gains task).   
 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we arbitrarily chose to give women a positive stereotype and 
men a negative stereotype; in Experiment 2 we do the opposite.  We assume that priming 
a positive stereotype will induce a promotion focus while priming a negative stereotype 
will induce a prevention focus.  We also manipulated the task reward structure; half of 
the participants completed the task gaining points for correct responses and gaining zero 
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points for errors while half lost fewer points for correct responses than for errors.  Using 
the concept of a regulatory fit, we predict that women will perform better in the gains 
version of the task as compared to the losses version.  In contrast, men will perform better 
in the losses version of the task as compared to the gains version.  Furthermore, we 
predict that we will replicate the classic stereotype threat work and demonstrate that 
women will perform better than men in the gains version of the task.  Based on our 
theoretical framework, we also predict that men will perform better than women in the 
losses version of the task. 
Method 
Participants 
Eighty undergraduate students (40 men and 40 women) at the University of Texas 
at Austin were given $8 for their participation.  Half of the men and half of the women 
were randomly assigned to the gains and losses reward structures. 
Design 
This Experiment had a 2 (Gender: Male, Female) × 2 (Reward Structure: Gains, 
Losses) design.   Reward Structure was manipulated between subjects. 
Stimuli and Stimulus Presentation 
 Participants viewed stimuli on a computer screen and were asked to classify a set 
of items into one of two categories.  The stimuli to be categorized were lines that varied 
across items in their length, orientation, and position within a box on the screen.  The 
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stimulus structure is shown in Figure 3.1.  For Category A, there were 24 stimuli sampled 
from each of 12 bivariate normal distributions on length and orientation resulting in 288 
stimuli.  For Category B, there were 72 stimuli sampled from 4 bivariate normal 
distributions on length and orientation resulting in 288 stimuli.  The position dimension 
was sampled independently of length and orientation for each category:  Category A used 
a univariate normal distribution with a mean of 253 pixels and a standard deviation of 75 
and Category B used a univariate normal distribution with a mean of 397 pixels and a 
standard deviation of 75.1  The lines were presented inside of a black 650 x 650 pixel 
box, centered vertically, and were randomly ordered for each participant in each block.  
There were 48 trials in each block and 12 blocks. 
The stimuli were generated such that using the position on the screen or the 
orientation of the line or the length of the line to classify the stimuli will result in 83% 
accuracy for a block of trials.  For example, Figure 4.1 shows the stimulus space and the 
set of items.  Each of the three possible dimensions (length, orientation, and position) is 
represented; each point is a specific line stimulus.  This stimulus space is being divided 
by a plane representing a decision criterion set using position.  A subject using this 
decision bound would classify all stimuli falling above the bound into Category A 
(represented by circles) and all stimuli falling below the bound into Category B 
(represented by plus-signs).  The unidimensional rules are fairly easy to verbalize and are 
salient to participants (Maddox, Baldwin, & Markman, 2006).  However, in this example, 
using a position decision criterion only allows for 83% correct classification. 
                                                 
1 By independently sampling position, we were able to make position especially salient to insure that our 




Figure 4.1.   Stimulus space used in Experiments 1 and 2 with a unidimensional rule on 
position represented.   
 
There is an optimal decision bound for this task that, if used, will yield 100% 
accuracy on the task.  This decision criterion requires a rule that takes into account both 
length and orientation.  This rule is:  If the length is long and the orientation is steep, then 
respond Category A; otherwise, respond Category B (please see Figure 3.1 for a 
graphical representation of this rule).  In order for participants to perform well in the task, 
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they need to abandon the use of unidimensional rules in favor of the more complex 
conjunctive one.  This switch requires cognitive flexibility.2 
Materials 
We used the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ: Higgins et al., 2001) as a 
measure of chronic promotion and chronic prevention focus.  This questionnaire asks 
participants to rate the frequency of specific events in their lives.  Participants completed 
the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI: Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988) the Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ: Meyer, Miller, & Metzger, 1990).  The BAI requires the 
participant to report how much they have been bothered by a range of symptoms in the 
last week, such as “terrified”, “nervous”, and “faint”.  The PSWQ requires that the 
participants rate how characteristic displayed items are of them.  Participants also 
completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS: Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988) which is a 20 adjective checklist that asks participants to report current 
emotional states (please see Appendix for scales). 
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in individual cubicles.  Participants first completed the 
RFQ, the PSWQ, and the BAI.  At the beginning of the classification task, participants 
were told that their job was to learn to classify items into two categories.  To induce a 
stereotype our participants read:  “This is an experiment testing sex differences in spatial 
                                                 
2 It is important to note that it is possible to use a conjunctive rule on length and orientation and not have 
perfect task performance.  Participants may set a rule using both dimensions but will not do so with a high 
level of precision.  This form of the rule is known as a sub-optimal rule on length and orientation. 
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abilities. Previous research has shown that women perform better than men on tests of 
spatial ability.” Thus, women in this task have a positive task-relevant stereotype and 
men have a negative task-relevant stereotype. 
In the gains task, participants were told that women tended to earn more than 86 
points per block, which is equivalent to a 90% correct criterion (correct on 43 of 48 
trials), and men tended to earn fewer.  In the losses task, participants were told that 
women tended to lose less than 58 points per block, which is again equivalent to a 90% 
criterion (correct on 43 of 48 trials), and men tended to lose more. 
Participants were able to track their progress using a vertically oriented “point 
meter”.  The point meter was located on the right side of the screen and was 750 x 50 
pixels.  The 0 point was marked on the meter as was the 90% criterion line.  Every time a 
participant correctly categorized an item, they heard a “ching” sound, like that from a 
cash register, and the word “Correct” appeared on the screen.  When participants were 
incorrect, they heard a buzzer and the word “Incorrect” appeared.  For participants in the 
gains task, the point meter started at 0, located at the bottom of the point meter, and 
participants gained 2 points for each correct response and gained 0 points for an incorrect 
response.  Also, the 90% criterion line was labeled “86 points”.  For participants in the 
losses task, the point meter started at 0 but 0 was located at the top of the point meter and 
the bonus criterion was labeled “-58 points”.  During this task, participants lost 1 point 
for a correct response and 3 points for an incorrect response.  Samples of the gains and 




Figure 4.2.   Sample screens for the gains and losses tasks 
 
A series of rating scales were used as manipulation checks.  These ratings were 
given just before participants began the classification task.  Participants rated: “how well 
do you think you will perform in this task on a scale of 1 to 9, where 1 = very bad and 9 = 
very good? How much do you like the task? (1 = not at all, 9 = very much) and How 
motivated are you to do well on the task (1 to 9)”.  Next, participants took the PANAS to 
get a measure of the positive and negative affect prior to completing the classification 
task. 
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Each participant completed 12 blocks of trials with 48 trials.  For each trial, the 
stimulus was displayed until the participant responded “A” or “B”.  Following feedback, 
the stimulus display disappeared for 250ms for the inter-trial-interval.  The point meter 
always remained visible. 
After the classification task, participants completed a final set of questionnaires.  
Participants completed the PANAS to get a measure of positive and negative affect after 
the classification task.  Participants were also asked to rate how well they believed they 
performed overall, how well they performed relative to men, and how well they 
performed relative to women. 
Results 
To test our hypotheses, we performed two different sets of analyses.  First, we 
analyzed the accuracy data to determine how the interaction of reward structure and 
regulatory focus influenced a basic performance metric.  Second, we used quantitative 
models to give us further insight into the strategies used by participants in the service of 
completing the task.  By identifying the strategies likely implemented by participants, we 
are able to make claims about the types of processes used during the perceptual 
classification learning task.  These model results are presented as supplementary support 
after the results from Experiment 2.  We also present the results from the pre- and post-
test questionnaires. 
Questionnaire Results 
All of the significant comparisons in the questionnaire results appear in Table 4.3.  
In addition, we found a significant interaction for the Negative Affect subscale of the 
PANAS collected after the manipulation.  The data were analyzed using an analysis of 
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variance (ANOVA) with Gender (Male, Female) and Reward Structure (Gains, Losses).  
This analysis revealed a marginally significant two-way interaction between Gender and 
Reward Structure, F(1,76) = 3.56, MSE = 26.0, p = .06.  Men in the losses and gains tasks 
averaged 11.9 and 12.4, respectively.  Women in the losses and gains tasks averaged 15.4 
and 11.6, respectively and this difference was marginally significant, t(38) = 1.88, p = 
.06. 
 
 Women Men Test 
RFQ: Prevention subscale 17.7 (3.6) 15.9 (3.3) t(78) = 2.35, p < .05 
PSWQ 51.9 (13.8) 45.6 (11.1) t(78) = 2.26, p < .05 
BAI 34.2 (9.8) 30.6 (7.6) t(78) =1.87, p = .07 
Performance 6.1 (1.9) 6.8 (1.4) t(78) = 1.89, p = .07 
Performance: relative to 
men 
6.3 (1.6) 7.1 (1.5) t(78) = 2.32, p < .05 
Table 4.3.   Significant comparisons in the Questionnaire data in Experiment 1 with 
means (standard deviations in parentheses). 
We used Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) to determine if the significant 
effects found in the questionnaire data could account for our effects.  The collected scales 
and ratings were not significant covariates, and as such, do not provide a possible 
alternative explanation for our effects.3  The bivariate correlations appear in Table 4.4. 
 
 
                                                 
3 This is not surprising because main effects are not likely to account for our interactions in the accuracy 
data.  The one significant interaction came from the Negative subscale of PANAS.  This too did not serve 













































































































































































1 0 -0.084 -0.054 0.039 0.141 0.131 0.137 0.017 0.068 0.123 0.03 .553(**) .492(**) .446(**)
Promotion
1 .228(*) -0.19 -0.149 -0.004 0 0.142 .227(*) -.232(*) .271(*) -0.188 0.127 0.056 -0.012
Prevention
1 -0.085 -0.213 -0.042 -0.019 -0.039 -0.121 -0.081 0.049 -.292(**) 0.06 -0.028 -0.09
PSWQ
1 .501(**) -.262(*) 0.078 0.004 -0.034 .495(**) -0.021 .377(**) -0.177 -0.169 -.291(**)
BAI
1 -.307(**) 0.081 0.057 0.044 .585(**) 0.048 .395(**) -0.054 -0.031 -.229(*)
Expectation
1 .374(**) .235(*) 0.127 -0.147 0.07 -0.076 .328(**) .409(**) .439(**)
Liking
1 .661(**) .313(**) .269(*) 0.214 -0.04 .249(*) .405(**) .272(*)
Motivation
1 .562(**) 0.207 .460(**) -0.025 .377(**) .420(**) .342(**)
Positive PANAS 
(pre) 1 -0.095 .623(**) -0.114 .237(*) .229(*) .240(*)
Negative 
PANAS (pre) 1 -0.032 .594(**) 0.139 0.131 -0.102
Positive PANAS 
(post) 1 -0.041 .289(**) .226(*) 0.21
Negative 




versus men 1 .629(**)
Performance 
versus women 1  
Note:  * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
Table 4.4.   Correlations between scales and total accuracy in Experiment 1.  Significant 
correlations appear in grey. 
Accuracy Analysis 
First, we computed the average accuracy for each participant in each block of 
trials.  Second, we calculated the proportion of participants reaching criterion (90% 
accuracy) for each block.  For our task, the criterion was established as part of the 
stereotype threat manipulation.  Our participants were told that women tended to get the 
amount of points corresponding to 90% correct on the task, or more, whereas men did 
not.  Third, we determined the first block that each participant met or exceeded this 
criterion. 
Average accuracy for each participant for each block.  The data were analyzed 
using a repeated measures ANOVA with Gender (Male, Female) and Reward Structure 
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(Gains, Losses) between participants and Blocks of trials within participants.  This 
analysis revealed a significant two-way interaction between Gender and Reward 


























Figure 4.3.   Proportion correct for women and men in the gains and losses tasks in 
Experiment 1 
To examine this interaction, we compared the average accuracy scores within 
each gender for gains and losses.  As predicted, men (negative stereotype) who 
performed the losses task performed significantly better (M = .89) than men who 
performed the gains task (M = .84) t(38) = 1.92, p < .05.  As shown in Figure 4.4, 
moreover, a binomial sign test reveals that men in the losses task performed better than 


























Figure 4.4.   Proportion correct across blocks for men in the gains and losses tasks in 
Experiment 1 
Comparing women in the gains (M = .87) and losses conditions (M = .85), 
revealed a non-significant difference, p = .13.  However, as predicted and depicted in 
Figure 4.5, using a binomial sign test, women (positive stereotype) in the gains task 



























Figure 4.5.   Proportion correct across blocks for women in the gains and losses tasks in 
Experiment 1 
Additionally, we examined the interaction in a manner consistent with the extant 
work on stereotype threat.  Instead of looking within men and within women to test the 
effects of being in a regulatory fit versus being in a regulatory mismatch, we secondarily 
examined the interaction of Gender and Reward Structure by testing men versus women 
for the gains and losses structures separately.  For gains, there was not a significant main 
effect of sex.  However, a binomial sign test reveals that women outperformed men, p < 
.05.  They performed better on 9 of the 12 blocks of trials and performed equally well on 
one block.  For losses, there was a main effect of sex, F(1,38) = 4.73, MSE = .04, p < .05.  
Men outperformed women on every block.  A binomial test reveals this male 
performance advantage was significant, p < .05. 
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Proportion of participants reaching criterion for each block.  We used binomial 
tests to assess whether the proportion of men who met or exceeded the criterion was 
larger in the losses task as compared to the gains task.  As shown in Figure 4.6, the 
binomial tests for blocks 1, 6, 7, 9, and 11 revealed the loss advantage, p < .05, and the 
test for block 10 was marginally significant in the same direction, p = .06.  A binomial 
sign test across blocks revealed that the male losses condition outperformed the male 
gains condition, p < .05, with a higher proportion of the participants meeting or 
exceeding the criterion on 11 of the 12 blocks (the 1 remaining block was a tie).  
Collapsing across blocks, 50% of the participants in the losses task exceeded the criterion 
as compared to 25% of the participants in the gains task.  Using a binomial test, this 



































Figure 4.6.   Proportion reaching criterion across blocks for men in the gains and losses 
tasks in Experiment 1 
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As shown in Figure 4.7, for women in the gains task as compared to women in the 
losses task, the binomial tests for blocks 5, 6, 7, 12 revealed better performance by 
women in the gains task, p < .05.  A binomial sign test across blocks revealed that the 
women in the gains condition outperformed the women in the losses condition, p < .05, 
with a higher proportion of the participants meeting or exceeding the criterion on 10 of 
the 12 blocks: 1 remaining block was a tie and in the first block 0% of the gains 
participants met or exceeded the criterion as compared to 5% of the losses participants.  
This difference is not statistically reliable.  Collapsing across blocks, 30% of the 
participants in the gains task exceeded the criterion as compared to 25% of the 




































Figure 4.7.   Proportion reaching criterion across blocks for women in the gains and 
losses tasks in Experiment 1 
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First block exceeding criterion.  Any participant who failed to meet the criterion 
during the experiment was coded as a 13.  This was done because this is the minimum 
value possible for a participant who had not met the criterion during the course of the 12 
block experiment.  Men in the losses condition exceeded the criterion sooner (after 3.65 
blocks on average) as compared to men in the gains condition (after 5.2 blocks on 
average). This difference was marginally significant, t(38) = 1.51, p = .07.  Women in the 
gains condition exceeded the criterion sooner (after 4.9 blocks on average) as compared 
to women in the losses condition (after 6.85 blocks on average), t(38) = 1.91, p < .05. 
 
Discussion 
Using an arbitrarily determined stereotype, we found that women and men 
responded differently to the gains and losses reward structures using task accuracy and 
the proportion of participants reaching the task criterion.  In this Experiment, we 
expected stereotype threat-consistent effects for the gains structure.  We found results 
consistent with our interpretation of the stereotype threat literature.  Women (given a 
positive stereotype) outperformed men (given a negative stereotype) in the gains version 
of the task.  Furthermore, we found effects consistent with our notion of regulatory fit.  In 
the gains version of the task, women are experiencing a regulatory match and men are 
experiencing a regulatory mismatch.  The opposite is true for the losses reward structure.  
Again, as predicted, men outperformed women in the losses version of the task.  Men 
have the regulatory match in the losses task.  We also find regulatory fit effects looking 
within gender.  Primed with a negative stereotype, the men in our study performed better 
on the losses version of the task as compared to the gains version.  In contrast, priming a 
positive stereotype led women perform better in the gains version of the task as compared 
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to the losses version.  Importantly, we randomly decided to induce a positive stereotype 
in women and a negative stereotype in men.  However, if we are correct in assuming that 
the results are due to the interaction between the task environment and induced focus we 
should be able to completely reverse the effects for men and women by reversing the 
valence of the stereotypes given to each gender. This is the aim of Experiment 2. 
 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we reverse the stereotype valence given to each gender.  Now, 
we give men a positive stereotype, and women a negative stereotype.  We predict that 
men will perform better in the gains version of the task as compared to the losses version 
and that women will perform better in the losses version of the task as compared to the 
gains version.  Furthermore, we predict men will perform better than women in the gains 
version and women will perform better than men in the losses version. To anticipate, the 
pattern of data supports our hypothesis and demonstrates that participants in a regulatory 




 Eighty undergraduate students (40 men and 40 women) at the University of Texas 
at Austin were given $8 for their participation.  Half of the men and half of the women 
were randomly assigned to the gains and losses reward structures.  The questionnaire data 
for 24 participants (12 men and 12 women) was lost because of a computer error. 
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Design 
This experiment used a 2 (Gender: Male, Female) × 2 (Reward Structure: Gains, 
Losses) design.   Reward Structure was manipulated between subjects. 
Stimuli and Stimulus Presentation 
We used the same stimuli as Experiment 1.  Like Experiment 1, there were 48 
trials in each block and 12 blocks. 
Materials 
We used the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ; Higgins et al., 2001), the 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck et al. 1988), the Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
(PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990), and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in individual cubicles.  At the beginning of the 
classification task, participants were told that their job was to learn to classify items into 
two categories.  To induce a stereotype our participants read that “men perform better 
than women on tests of spatial ability.” 
In the gains task, participants were told that the men tended to earn more than 86 
points per block, which is equivalent to a 90% correct criterion (correct on 43 of 48 
trials), and women tended to earn fewer.  In the losses task, participants were told that 
men tended to lose less than 58 points per block, which is again equivalent to a 90% 
criterion (correct on 43 of 48 trials), and women tended to lose more. 
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The remainder of the task procedure was identical to Experiment 1. 
Results 
Again, to test our hypotheses, we analyzed accuracy data and used quantitative 
models to give us insight into the strategies used by participants during the experimental 
task.  These model results are presented as supplementary support in the next section.  
We also present the results from the pre- and post-test questionnaires. 
Questionnaire Results 
All of the significant comparisons in the questionnaire results appear in Table 4.5.  
Correlations appear in Table 4.6.  Prior to the experimental manipulation, our participants 
completed the RFQ, the PSWQ, and the BAI.  There were neither significant interactions 
of reward structure and gender nor were there effects of reward structure.  However, there 
were effects of gender.  Prior to the experimental manipulation, like Experiment 1, 
women scored higher than men on the Prevention subscale of the RFQ and on the PSWQ.  
After the manipulation, we collected the Positive and Negative subscales of the PANAS 
and ratings of liking, motivation, and expected performance.  There were no significant 
differences between our groups on these measures. 
 
 Women Men Test 
RFQ: Prevention subscale 17.5 (4.4) 15.2 (3.8) t(54) = 2.04, p < .05 
PSWQ 53.7 (13.5) 45.8 (14.8) t(54) = 2.09, p < .05 
Table 4.5.  Significant comparisons in the Questionnaire data in Experiment 2 with 
means (standard deviations in parentheses). 
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After the manipulation and classification task, we found a significant interaction 
for the Positive Affect subscale of the PANAS.  The data were analyzed using an 
ANOVA with Gender (Male, Female) and Reward Structure (Gains, Losses).  This 
analysis revealed a significant two-way interaction between Gender and Reward 
Structure, F(1,52) = 5.22, MSE = 85.3, p < .05.  Women in the losses and gains tasks 
averaged 15.4 and 23.5, respectively and this difference was significant, t(26) = 2.8, p < 













































































































































































1 -0.026 -0.23 0.186 -0.088 0.089 0.012 0.143 0.06 0.041 -0.051 -0.154 .411(**) .378(**) 0.205
Promotion
1 0.004 -0.156 -0.052 0.081 -0.126 0.033 0.04 -0.084 -0.082 .276(*) -.328(*) -0.147 -.269(*)
Prevention
1 -0.1 -0.019 0.091 .284(*) 0.077 0.027 0.035 0.225 -0.024 0.224 0.099 .315(*)
PSWQ
1 .366(**) 0.04 -0.047 0.127 -0.015 .321(*) -0.089 0.191 0.107 0.201 0.031
BAI
1 -0.068 -0.068 -0.131 -0.01 0.235 -0.175 0.042 -0.161 -0.145 -0.08
Expectation
1 .678(**) .705(**) .600(**) 0.179 .370(**) 0.164 .273(*) 0.14 .399(**)
Liking
1 .763(**) .712(**) 0.256 .471(**) 0.045 .284(*) 0.139 .388(**)
Motivation
1 .705(**) 0.166 .451(**) 0.032 .321(*) 0.219 .395(**)
Positive PANAS 
(pre) 1 .291(*) .577(**) 0.195 0.21 0.092 .306(*)
Negative 
PANAS (pre) 1 0.132 .569(**) 0.095 0.069 0.247
Positive PANAS 
(post) 1 0.074 .355(**) 0.15 .335(*)
Negative 




versus men 1 .589(**)
Performance 
versus women 1  
Note:  * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
Table 4.6.   Correlations between scales and total accuracy in Experiment 2.  Significant 
correlations appear in grey. 
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We used ANCOVAs to determine if the significant effects found in the 
questionnaire data could account for our effects.  We started by considering our pre-
manipulation questionnaire data:  the Promotion and Prevention subscales of the RFQ, 
the BAI, and the PSWQ.  The covariate, Prevention, was significantly related to task 
accuracy F(1,48) = 4.12, MSE = .006, p < .05.  After controlling for Prevention scores, 
there was a main effect of reward structure, F(1,48) = 5.0, MSE = .006, p < .05.  
Participants in the gains structure (M = .86) performed better than participants in the 
losses structure (M = .81).  We secondarily calculated correlations between accuracy and 
the potential covariates collected after the manipulation.  We found that ratings of 
performance and ratings of performance relative to men were correlated with task 
accuracy, r = .41 and .38, respectively.  These ratings were also highly correlated with 
each other, r = .76.  When entered independently as covariates, each is significantly 
related to task accuracy [performance, F(1,48) = 8.3, MSE = .005, p < .05, and relative to 
men, F(1,48) = 7.2, MSE = .006, p < .05] and remove the effect of our experimental 
groups.  While true covariates, these variables are removing the group effect based on the 
strong (and unsurprising) relationship that exists between accuracy and subjective 




As for Experiment 1, we computed the average accuracy for each participant in 
each block of trials, the proportion of participants reaching criterion (90% accuracy) for 
each block, and the first block that each participant met or exceeded this criterion.  Again, 
for our task, the criterion was established as part of the stereotype threat manipulation.  
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Our participants were told that men tended to get the amount of points corresponding to 
90% correct on the task, or more, whereas women did not. 
Average accuracy for each participant for each block.  The data were analyzed 
using a repeated measures ANOVA with Gender (Male, Female) and Reward Structure 
(Gains, Losses) between participants and Blocks of trials within participants.  This 
analysis revealed a marginally significant two-way interaction between Gender and 






























                                                 
4 In addition, this analysis revealed a significant two-way interaction between Block and Reward Structure, 
F(11,836) = 2.68, MSE = .006, p <.05.  To examine this interaction, we compared the average accuracy 
scores within each block for gains and losses.  Participants who performed the gains task performed 
significantly better than participants who performed the losses task in block 6 [t (78) = 2.13, p < .05]. 
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To examine this interaction, we compared the average accuracy scores within 
each gender for gains and losses.  As predicted, men (positive stereotype) who performed 
the gains task performed significantly better (M = .86) than did men who performed the 
losses task (M = .82) t(38) = 1.75, p < .05.  As shown in Figure 4.9, moreover, a binomial 
sign test reveals that men in the gains task performed better than men in the losses task, p 
< .05, and in fact obtained higher performance accuracy in 11 of the 12 experimental 
blocks.  The one block where the losses condition performed better than the gains 































For women, there was not a statistically reliable difference for performance on the 
gains (M = .83) and losses (M = .84) tasks.  As depicted in Figure 4.10, women (negative 
stereotype) in the losses task outperformed women in the gains task and obtained higher 
accuracy on 8 of the 12 blocks although this difference was not significant using a 


























Figure 4.10.  Proportion correct across blocks for women in the gains and losses tasks in 
Experiment 2 
Additionally, we examined the interaction of Gender and Reward Structure by 
testing men versus women for the gains and losses structures separately.  This is the 
method that is consistent with the work on stereotype threat.  For gains, there was not a 
significant main effect of gender.  However, a binomial sign test reveals that men 
outperformed women, p < .05.  They performed better on all 12 blocks of trials. For 
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losses, there was not a significant main effect of gender.  However, women outperformed 
men on every block.  A binomial test reveals this female performance advantage was 
significant, p < .05. 
Proportion of participants reaching criterion for each block.  We used binomial 
tests to assess whether the proportion of men who met or exceeded the criterion was 
larger in the gains task as compared to the losses task.  As shown in Figure 4.11, the 
binomial tests for blocks 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10 revealed this advantage of the gains over the 
losses task, p < .05, and the test for block 3 was marginally significant in the same 
direction, p = .06.  A binomial sign test across blocks revealed a marginally significant 
effect in that the male gains condition outperformed the male losses condition, p = .07, 
with a higher proportion of the participants meeting or exceeding the criterion on 9 of the 
12 blocks (2 remaining blocks were a tie and men in the losses condition outperformed 
men in the gains condition in block 1).  Collapsing across blocks, 40% of the participants 
in the gains task exceeded the criterion as compared to 20% of the participants in the 
losses task.  Using a binomial test, this difference is statistically reliable, p < .05. 
As shown in Figure 4.12, for women in the losses task as compared to women in 
the gains task, the binomial test for block 3 revealed the advantage for the losses task, p < 
.05.  A binomial sign test across blocks revealed that women in the losses condition 
outperformed women in the gains condition in 5 of the 12 blocks.  This difference is not 
statistically reliable.  Collapsing across blocks, 25% of the participants in the gains task 
exceeded the criterion as compared to 20% of the participants in the losses task.  Using a 





































Figure 4.11.  Proportion reaching criterion across blocks for men in the gains and losses 




































Figure 4.12. Proportion reaching criterion across blocks for women in the gains and 
losses tasks in Experiment 2 
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First block exceeding criterion.  Again, any participant who failed to meet the 
criterion during the experiment was coded as a 13.  Men in the gains condition exceeded 
the criterion sooner (after 4.8 blocks on average) as compared to men in the losses 
condition (after 7.15 blocks on average), t(38) = 1.91, p < .05.  Women in the losses 
condition exceeded the criterion sooner (after 6.25 blocks on average) as compared to 




By switching the valence of the stereotypes applied to each gender, we reversed 
the effects for each gender found in Experiment 1.   We found results consistent with our 
interpretation of the stereotype threat literature.  Men outperformed women in the gains 
version of the task.  Furthermore, women outperformed men in the losses version of the 
task.  This performance difference occurs because men and women are experiencing 
regulatory fits in the gains and losses versions, respectively.  Also consistent with 
regulatory fit, primed with a positive stereotype, the men in our study performed better on 
the gains version of the task as compared to the losses version.  Admittedly, our effects in 
Experiment 2 for women are not as large as those in Experiment 1.  This cross-
experimental difference is examined in more detail in the General Discussion section for 




In Experiment 1, we found that women performed better in the gains task as 
compared to women in the losses task while men in the losses task performed better than 
men in the gains task.  In contrast, in Experiment 2, we found that men performed better 
in the gains task than men in the losses task.  The results for women were more 
equivocal.  Women in the losses task obtained higher accuracy scores than women in the 
gains task in 8 of the 12 blocks but this difference was not statistically reliable. 
An advantage of using this classification task is that we have computational 
models that allow us to characterize participants’ responses on a block-by-block basis. 
Models allow us to determine the types of strategies used by participants during 
classification learning instead of being forced to infer strategies from accuracy data. In 
this section we present data from our model-based analyses. 
Following Maddox, Baldwin, & Markman (2006), we hypothesize that 
participants start with simple unidimensional rules to classify the stimuli and then switch 
to the more complex conjunctive rule on length and orientation that can provide a means 
to exceed the 90% accuracy criterion.  We believe that participants experiencing a 
regulatory match will be more likely to abandon the simple rules in favor of the more 
complex conjunctive rule. 
To test this hypothesis, we fit a series of decision-bound models to the data for 
each participant for each block (Ashby & Maddox, 1993; Maddox & Ashby, 1993).  The 
unidimensional model on position assumes that the participant used a criterion on 
position and put all of the lines to the left in one category and all of the lines to the right 
in the other category.  The unidimensional model on orientation assumes that the 
participant’s criterion involved one response for shallow lines and another response for 
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steep lines.  The unidimensional model on length assumes one response for short lines 
and another response for long lines.  Each of these unidimensional models uses two free 
parameters: one decision criterion and one noise parameter.  The conjunctive model 
assumes that the participant used length and orientation.  We fit two different conjunctive 
models.  First, we fit an optimal model which assumes the participant used the optimal 
criterion on both length and orientation.  This model only has one free noise parameter.  
Second, we fit a suboptimal model which assumes that the participant used criteria on 
both length and orientation but these criteria were not optimal.  Therefore, this model has 
three free parameters: one for the length criterion, one for the orientation criterion, and 
one noise parameter. 
The model parameters were estimated using maximum likelihood (Ashby, 1992).  
We found the best fitting model using:  AIC = 2r -2lnL (Akaike, 1974; Takane & 
Shibayama, 1992) where r is the number of parameters in the model and lnL is the log 
likelihood of the model given the data.  This criterion allows us to assess the goodness-
of-fit of models that differ in the number of free parameters, and select the model that 
provides the most parsimonious account of the data (i.e., the model with the smallest AIC 
value). 
Before summarizing the conjunctive model results, it is important to determine 
that the models provided a good account of the data.  The suboptimal conjunctive model 
accounted for an average of 91% and 89% of the total category responses in Experiments 







Model 1 2 
Optimal Conjunctive 0.87 0.83 
Suboptimal Conjunctive 0.91 0.89 
Length 0.63 0.61 
Orient 0.63 0.63 
Position 0.83 0.82 
Table 4.7.   Percent of total category responses accounted for by each model type 
For both experiments, the unidimensional rules on length and orientation were 
rarely used by participants.  The unidimensional length and orientation models best fit the 
data 5% and 17% of the time, respectively.  As such, they will not be discussed further.  
In contrast, the unidimensional position rule best fit 30 % of the data or more for each of 
the experimental groups.  The conjunctive model fit over 60 % of the data in the final 
block of trials for all groups in Experiment 1 and over 45 % of the data in Experiment 2.  
The average accuracy for each participant using the conjunctive rule was approximately 
90 % for Experiments 1 and 2.   
 
Experiment 1: Women primed with positive stereotype. Figure 4.13 displays the 
proportion of data sets best fit by a conjunctive rule model for men in the gains and losses 
tasks across block. Because men in the losses condition are in a regulatory match relative 
to men in the gains condition, we predict that a larger proportion of men/losses data sets 
will be best fit by a conjunctive rule model. This pattern held in 10 of the 12 blocks of 
trials (significant based on a sign test), and was significant (based on binomial tests) in 



































Figure 4.13.     Proportion best fit by the correct conjunctive rule for men in the gains and 
losses tasks in Experiment 1 
 
The opposite pattern was predicted for women. Specifically, women in the gains 
condition are in a regulatory match and should be more likely to use a conjunctive rule 
then women in the losses condition who are in a regulatory mismatch. This pattern held 
in 10 of the 12 blocks of trials (significant based on a sign test), and was significant 



































Figure 4.14.     Proportion best fit by the correct conjunctive rule for women in the gains 
and losses tasks in Experiment 1 
 
Experiment 2:  Men primed with a positive stereotype.  As predicted, for men, as 
shown in Figure 4.15, the binomial tests for blocks 2, 3, and 9 revealed the gains 
advantage, p < .05, while block 1 showed a loss advantage, p < .05.  A binomial sign test 
across blocks revealed that the data in the men/gains condition was better fit by the 
conjunctive rule more frequently than the data in the men losses condition, p < .05, with a 




































Figure 4.15.     Proportion best fit by the correct conjunctive rule for men in the gains and 
losses tasks in Experiment 2 
 
For women, a binomial test for block 11 revealed more conjunctive rule use likely 
in the losses task, p < .05, while block 6 showed more women in the gains task likely 
using the rule, p < .05 (see Figure 4.16).  A binomial sign test across blocks revealed that 



































Figure 4.16.  Proportion best fit by the correct conjunctive rule for women in the gains 
and losses tasks in Experiment 2 
 
General Discussion 
In Experiments 1 and 2 we found results consistent with the work on stereotype 
threat looking within the losses and gains tasks.  In Experiment 1, women were primed 
with a task-relevant positive stereotype and men were primed with a task-relevant 
negative stereotype.  Women outperformed men in 9 of the 12 blocks in the gains task.   
In Experiment 2, we switched the valence of the stereotypes applied to gender and got a 
predicted performance reversal: men outperformed women in all 12 blocks of trials in the 
gains task. 
We also got effects that support our notion of regulatory fit.  Women in 
Experiment 1 and men in Experiment 2 were experiencing a regulatory match in the gains 
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task whereas the other groups were experiencing a regulatory mismatch.  Using the 
proposed motivation-learning framework (Maddox, Markman, & Baldwin, 2006), we 
predicted and obtained the predicted results for the losses task.  In Experiment 1, men 
outperformed women in all 12 blocks and in Experiment 2, women outperformed men in 
all 12 blocks of trials.  This result was predicted because participants primed with a 
negative stereotype are experiencing a regulatory match in the losses task. 
We also predicted and obtained results that support regulatory fit looking within 
gender for the gains and losses tasks.  Participants performed better in a task that matched 
their situationally-primed focus than in a task that mismatched their primed focus. 
Our participants completed a classification task in which they learned to classify 
lines that varied in their length, orientation, and position.  Participants could achieve 
perfect task performance if they learned to classify the lines using a conjunctive rule on 
both the length and orientation dimensions.  To meet the learning criterion, participants 
needed to switch from using the easier and more obvious unidimensional rules to the 
more complex conjunctive rule.  This rule switching requires cognitive flexibility. 
Based on the prior work by Maddox, Baldwin, and Markman (2006), we 
predicted that individuals experiencing a regulatory match would perform better in the 
task than participants in a regulatory mismatch.  We argued like Seibt and Förster (2004) 
that priming a negative stereotype induced a prevention focus while priming a positive 
stereotype induced a promotion focus.  After stereotype priming (valence manipulated 
across experiments), our participants completed a gains version of our task where they 
gained points for correct responses or a losses version of the task where they lost points 
for correct responses.  For the gains task, we predicted that participants primed with a 
positive stereotype would be experiencing a regulatory match while participants primed 
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with a negative stereotype would be experiencing a regulatory mismatch.  We predicted 
the opposite would be true for the losses task. 
In Experiment 1, we gave women a positive stereotype and men a negative 
stereotype.  As predicted, we found that women performed better in the gains task as 
compared to women in the losses task.  Using task accuracy and the proportion to reach 
the criterion, women in the gains task performed better in 10 of the 12 experimental 
blocks.  Using the first block that a participant met or exceeded the criterion, women in 
the gains condition exceeded the criterion sooner than women in the losses condition.  
Men in the losses task outperformed men in the gains task.  They performed better in all 
12 blocks of trials.  They also reached the performance criterion more often in 11 of the 
12 blocks and reached or exceeded the performance criterion sooner. 
In Experiment 2, we gave men a positive stereotype and women a negative 
stereotype.  We found men who performed the gains task performed significantly better 
than men who performed the losses task.  They scored higher on 11 of the 12 
experimental blocks and more of them reached the criterion in 9 of the 12 blocks.  In 
addition, men in the gains task met or exceed the performance criterion sooner than men 
in the losses task.  For women, our results are not statistically reliable. 
The modeling results support the task analyses.  In Experiment 1, the female data 
in the gains task more likely came from conjunctive rule use as compared to the data in 
the losses task.  The reverse was true for men: the data in the losses task was more 
consistent with conjunctive rule use than the data in the gains task.  As predicted, in 
Experiment 2, the male data for the gains task was more consistent with conjunctive rule 
use than the data for the losses task.  For women, the modeling did not reveal likely 
differences in conjunctive rule application during classification learning. 
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Across both experiments, we find data in support of our claim that a regulatory 
match produces more flexible processing than a regulatory mismatch.  Our data from 
Experiment 1 show the complete cross-over interaction with women in gains performing 
better than in losses and men in losses performing better than in gains.  In Experiment 2, 
we find men in gains performing better than in losses and find limited support for our 
prediction that women in losses would perform better than women in gains. 
It is possible that women in Experiment 2 were unaffected by the induction of a 
task-relevant negative stereotype.  We believe this explanation is likely given the results 
of our covariation analyses in Experiment 2.  Prior to adding covariates, we found that 
men in gains (M = .86) performed better than men in losses (M = .82).  After adding the 
Prevention scores, the adjusted male data did not change significantly:  average accuracy 
for gains is .86 and for losses .81.  In contrast, the data for women did change 
significantly.  Prior to accounting for the covariate, women in gains (M = .83) did not 
differ from women in losses (M = .84).  However using the Prevention scores, women in 
gains (M = .86) performed better than women in losses (M = .82).  This suggests that 
women were influenced by their chronic level of focus instead of by our presented 
situational focus.  That is, women did not adopt a situational-prevention focus.  Given 
that women in gains performed better than women in losses, it is possible that women 




EXPERIMENTS 3 AND 4:  INFORMATION INTEGRATION TASK 
Experiments 3 and 4 use an information-integration category structure (e.g., 
Maddox & Ashby, 2004), and a classification task that requires that participants learn to 
classify lines into two categories.  As shown in Figure 3.2, the stimulus dimensions are 
the same as those in Experiments 1 and 2, but in this case a plane cuts the stimulus space 
on the diagonal creating a rule that is difficult to verbalize.  It is seemingly nonsensical to 
describe a rule in which a stimulus goes in a category because it is longer than it is steep 
because the dimensions are measured by different units.     
As demonstrated previously by Maddox, Baldwin, and Markman (2006), this 
structure requires participants abandon the explicit rule-based system in favor of the 
implicit learning system.  For this reason, flexible processing hurts performance.  
Participants behaving flexibly are more likely to spend time explicitly testing rules.   
I present this category structure to participants in two Experiments.  In both 
Experiments, half of the participants gain points for correct responses and half lose points 
for correct responses.  In Experiment 3, I prime a positive stereotype for women and a 
negative stereotype for men.  In Experiment 4, I reverse the gender assigned to positive 
and negative stereotypes.  To increase the size of the effects found in Experiment 1 and 2, 
I use a more powerful stereotype manipulation.  Participants have the instructions and 
threat manipulation auditorally and visually presented.  Furthermore, the stereotype 
manipulation includes “facts” to support the threat claims.   
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As in Experiments 1 and 2, I predict that a positive stereotype will induce a 
situational promotion focus and a negative stereotype will induce a situational prevention 
focus.  Further, I predict that individuals experiencing a regulatory match (e.g., positive 
stereotype with gains and negative stereotype with losses) will perform worse than 
individuals experiencing a regulatory mismatch (e.g., positive with losses and negative 
with gains).  That is, the match participants will continue to test rules that cannot yield 
good enough performance.  In sum, I expect to completely reverse the effects found in 
Experiments 1 and 2.  In the gains version, these results would replicate Seibt and Förster 
(2004) Experiment 2. 
These results would provide critical insight into stereotype threat mechanisms.  
Across all four Experiments, I would demonstrate that the influence of a negative 
stereotype depends both on the reward structure of the task (creating a regulatory match 
or mismatch) and the degree of flexibility required for good task performance.  To 
anticipate, the pattern of data in these Experiments is not entirely supportive of my 
hypotheses.  I do not find consistent results in the accuracy data.  However, I find some 
evidence for predicted strategy use in Experiment 3 and the complete interaction for 
strategy as predicted in model-based analyses in Experiment 4. 
Experiment 3 
In Experiment 3, I give women a positive stereotype and men a negative 
stereotype.  I predict that women will perform better in the losses version of the task as 
compared to the gains version and that men will perform better in the gains version of the 
task as compared to the losses version.  Furthermore, I predict women will perform better 
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than men in the losses version and men will perform better than women in the gains 
version.  This pattern of data is consistent with my hypotheses because it would 
demonstrate that participants in a regulatory mismatch perform better on the task as 
compared to participants in a regulatory match.  The match participants are predicted to 
persist in using the explicit testing system which will hurt their performance on the 




 Eighty undergraduate students (40 men and 40 women) at the University of Texas 
at Austin were given $8 for their participation.  Half of the men and half of the women 
were randomly assigned to the gains and losses reward structures.   
Design 
This experiment used a 2 (Gender: Male, Female) × 2 (Reward Structure: Gains, 
Losses) design.   Reward Structure was manipulated between subjects. 
Stimuli and Stimulus Presentation 
I used the information-integration stimuli shown in Figure 3.2.  Other than the 
change in stimuli to form categories consistent with an information integration rule, 
stimuli selection and presentation were identical to Experiments 1 and 2.  There were 48 
trials in each block and 12 blocks. 
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Materials 
I used the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ; Higgins et al., 2001), the Beck 
Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck et al. 1988), the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; 
Meyer et al., 1990), and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in individual cubicles and all instructions were presented 
on the computer screen and auditorally using headphones.  At the beginning of the 
classification task, participants were told that their job was to learn to classify items into 
two categories.  To induce a stereotype participants read that women perform better than 
men on tests of spatial ability.  For example, participants in the losses task were presented 
with: 
This is an experiment testing sex differences in spatial abilities. Recent research 
(Simon & Small, 2005) found that college students differ in their ability to think 
spatially.  Some students are better able to mentally separate objects into pieces.  
These students easily separate objects correctly and finish quickly.  In a large 
review of 286 studies, Voyer, Voyer, and Bryden (1995) determined that women 
perform better than men across a wide-range of spatial tasks.   
 
Researchers have speculated on the aspects of our evolutionary environment that 
would have led to these differences.  For example, in early hunter-gatherer 
societies women were responsible for gathering berries and vegetables for 
consumption, and so they had to develop accurate spatial maps of their 
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environment.  This association between gender-roles and the early evolutionary 
environment may have led to differences in male and female brain development 
as well as differences in the brain's response to estrogen and testosterone. 
 
We are interested in further examining this sex difference.   
 
In this experiment, you will lose only one point for each correct response and lose 
three points for each incorrect response. In this task, women tend to lose no more 
than 58 points per block of trials and men tend to lose more than 58 points per 
block of trials.  
 
Please try your best in this task. Before continuing, please indicate whether you 
are male or female. If you are male, press the "M" key. If you are female, press 
the "F" key. 
 
In the gains task, participants were told that women tended to earn more than 86 
points per block, which is equivalent to a 90% correct criterion (correct on 43 of 48 
trials), and men tended to earn fewer.  In the losses task, participants were told that 
women tended to lose less than 58 points per block, which is again equivalent to a 90% 
criterion (correct on 43 of 48 trials), and men tended to lose more. 




To test the hypotheses, I analyzed accuracy data and used quantitative models to 
give me insight into the strategies used by participants during the experimental task.  I 
also present the results from the pre- and post-test questionnaires.  The model fits are 
presented in a supplementary section after the results from Experiment 4. 
Questionnaire Results 
All of the significant group comparisons in the questionnaire data appear in Table 
4.8.  Correlations appear in Table 4.9.  Prior to the experimental manipulation, 
participants completed the RFQ, the PSWQ, and the BAI.  There were neither significant 
interactions of reward structure and gender nor were there main effects of reward 
structure.  However, there were main effects of gender.  As in Experiments 1 and 2, 
women scored higher than men on the Prevention subscale of the RFQ and on the PSWQ.   
After the manipulation, I collected the Positive and Negative subscales of PANAS 
and ratings of liking, motivation, and expected performance.  The data were analyzed 
using an ANOVA with Gender (Male, Female) and Reward Structure (Gains, Losses).  
This analysis revealed a marginally significant two-way interaction between Gender and 
Reward Structure for motivation, F(1,76) = 3.7, MSE = 2.65, p = .06.  Women in the 
gains and losses tasks averaged 7.7 and 6.7, respectively, and this difference was 
marginally significant, t(38) = 1.8, p = .07.  Men in the gains and losses tasks averaged 







 Women Men Test 
RFQ: Prevention subscale 18.4 (3.3) 16.5 (4.0) t(78) = 2.37, p < .05 
PSWQ 53.3 (13.0) 41.2 (12.4) t(78) = 4.27, p < .07 
Table 4.8.  Significant comparisons in the Questionnaire data in Experiment 3 with 
means (standard deviations in parentheses). 
After the manipulation and classification task, I collected the PANAS and ratings 
of perceived performance.  I found marginally significant interactions for the 
performance ratings when the comparison group was not specified and when the 
comparison group was women.  The data were analyzed using an ANOVA with Gender 
(Male, Female) and Reward Structure (Gains, Losses).  This analysis revealed a 
marginally significant two-way interaction between Gender and Reward Structure for no 
specified comparison group, F(1,76) = 2.88, MSE = 2.7, p = .09.  Women in the gains and 
losses tasks averaged 5.3 and 4.5, respectively.  Men in the gains and losses tasks 
averaged 5.9 and 6.3, respectively.  There was also a main effect of gender, F(1,76) = 
10.19, MSE = 2.7, p < .05.  Women rated their performance (M = 4.9) lower than men (M 
= 6.1). 
A second analysis revealed a marginally significant two-way interaction between 
Gender and Reward Structure when women was the comparison group, F(1,76) = 3.3, 
MSE = 3.2, p = .07.  Women in the gains and losses tasks averaged 5.2 and 3.6, 
respectively, and this difference was significant, t(38) = 2.5, p < .05.  Men in the gains 
and losses tasks averaged 4.7 and 4.8, respectively.  
ANCOVAs revealed that none of the significant effects found in the questionnaire 
data produced significant main effects or interactions in the accuracy data after being 



















































































































































1 0.085 0.12 -0.177 -0.033 0.198 -0.058 -0.002 0.043 -0.135 0.084 -.237(*) .265(*) .243(*) 0.201
Promotion
1 0.126 -0.181 -0.068 0.114 -0.069 0.019 0.016 0.005 -0.094 -0.061 0.09 0.068 0.079
Prevention
1 0.015 -0.089 0.079 -0.028 0.079 0.021 -0.219 0.134 -0.188 0.015 0.121 -0.066
PSWQ
1 .447(**) -.357(**) -0.129 -0.009 -0.093 .368(**) -0.019 .284(*) -.298(**) -.252(*) -.274(*)
BAI
1 -0.016 -0.02 -0.05 0.021 .414(**) -0.094 .262(*) -0.136 -.227(*) -0.088
Expectation
1 .457(**) .385(**) .251(*) -0.198 0.137 -0.003 .394(**) .369(**) .389(**)
Liking
1 .590(**) .387(**) -0.07 .255(*) -0.043 .239(*) 0.119 0.107
Motivation
1 .511(**) -0.122 .320(**) 0.07 0.189 0.021 0.117
Positive PANAS 
(pre) 1 -0.019 .588(**) 0.052 .274(*) 0.212 0.192
Negative PANAS 
(pre) 1 0.012 .457(**) -0.125 -0.079 -0.036
Positive PANAS 
(post) 1 -0.059 .408(**) .246(*) .280(*)
Negative PANAS 






women 1  
Note:  * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
Table 4.9.   Correlations between scales and total accuracy in Experiment 3.  Significant 
correlations appear in grey. 
Accuracy Analysis 
As for Experiments 1 and 2, I computed the average accuracy for each participant 
in each block of trials, the proportion of participants reaching criterion (90% accuracy) 
for each block, and the first block that each participant met or exceeded this criterion.  
Again, the criterion was established as part of the stereotype threat manipulation.  
Participants were told that women tended to get the amount of points corresponding to 
90% correct on the task, or more, whereas men did not. 
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Average accuracy for each participant for each block.  The data were analyzed 
using a repeated measures ANOVA with Gender (Male, Female) and Reward Structure 
(Gains, Losses) between participants and Blocks of trials within participants.  There were 
neither significant interactions nor main effects.  The data averaged across trials is shown 
in Figure 4.17.  Within women and men, there was not a statistically reliable difference 
for performance on the gains (M = .82 and M = .82, respectively) and losses (M = .80 and 


























Figure 4.17.  Proportion correct for women and men in the gains and losses tasks in 
Experiment 3 
As shown in Figures 4.18 and 4.19, binomial sign tests find men (negative 
stereotype) in the gains task did not perform better than men in the losses task but women 
in the gains tasks did perform better than women in the losses task, p < .05.  Women 
(positive stereotype) in the gains task outperformed women in the losses task and 





















































Figure 4.19.  Proportion correct across blocks for women in the gains and losses tasks in 
Experiment 3 
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Additionally, I examined the interaction of Gender and Reward Structure by 
testing men versus women for the gains and losses tasks.  This is the method that is 
consistent with the work on stereotype threat.  For gains and losses, there was not a 
significant main effect of gender.  Binomial tests also reveal no difference between men 
and women in gains or losses.   
Proportion of participants reaching criterion for each block.  I used binomial tests 
to assess whether the proportion of men who met or exceeded the criterion was larger in 
the gains task as compared to the losses task.  As shown in Figure 4.20, the binomial tests 
for blocks 4, 11, and 12 revealed this advantage of the gains over the losses task, p < .05, 
and the tests for blocks 2 and 9 were marginally significant in the same direction, p = .08 
and .07, respectively.  A binomial sign test across blocks revealed no difference between 



































Figure 4.20.  Proportion reaching criterion across blocks for men in the gains and losses 
tasks in Experiment 3 
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As shown in Figure 4.21, for women in the losses task as compared to women in 
the gains task, binomial tests revealed no differences.  A binomial sign test across blocks 



































Figure 4.21.  Proportion reaching criterion across blocks for women in the gains and 
losses tasks in Experiment 3 
Analyzing the data in a manner consistent with stereotype threat, binomial tests 
reveal that men in the gains task (mismatch group) outperformed women in the gains task 
(match) in blocks 4, 9, 10, 11, and 12, p < .05, with a marginal effect in the same 
direction in block 2, p = .08.  A binomial sign test also shows that men outperformed 
women in the gains task, p < .05, in 10 of the 12 experimental blocks. 
In the losses task, women (mismatch) did not outperform men (match) as 
expected.  In fact, the reverse is true.  Binomial tests show that men outperformed women 
in blocks 6 and 8, p < .05, and performed better across blocks according to a sign test, p < 
.05.  Men outperformed women in 7 of 12 experimental blocks and equaled women in the 
remaining 5 blocks. 
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First block exceeding criterion.  Any participant who failed to meet the criterion 
during the experiment was coded as a 13.  Men in the gains task exceeded the criterion 
sooner (after 8 blocks on average) as compared to men in the losses task (after 9.85 
blocks on average).  This difference is marginally significant, t(38) = 1.4, p = .085.  
Women in the gains task exceeded the criterion sooner (after 10.15 blocks on average) as 
compared to women in the losses task (after 11 blocks on average), but this difference 
was not statistically reliable. 
 
Discussion 
The goal of Experiment 3 was to reverse the effects for each gender found in 
Experiment 1.   In Experiments 1 and 3, all participants were told women are better at the 
task.  Women were experiencing a match in the gains task; men were experiencing a 
match in the losses task.  This match was beneficial in Experiment 1 but was predicted to 
be disadvantageous in Experiment 3.  I found results consistent with my interpretation of 
the stereotype threat literature.  As measured by the proportion of participants reaching 
the criterion, men outperformed women in the gains version of the task.  However, men 
outperformed women in the losses version of the task as well.  Also consistent with 
regulatory fit theory, the men reached the criterion sooner on the gains version of the task 
as compared to the losses version.  Inconsistent with my predictions, across blocks, 




In Experiment 4, I give men a positive stereotype and women a negative 
stereotype.  I predict that men will perform better in the losses task as compared to the 
gains task and that women will perform better in the gains task as compared to the losses 
task.  Furthermore, I predict men will perform better than women in the losses task and 
women will perform better than men in the gains task.  Like Experiment 3, participants in 
a regulatory mismatch should perform better on the task as compared to participants in a 
regulatory match.  Based on the primed stereotype, I expect to reverse the effects found 
in Experiment 3.  Further, based on the task performed, I expect to reverse the effects 




 One hundred undergraduate students (50 men and 50 women) at the University of 
Texas at Austin were given $8 for their participation.  Half of the men and half of the 
women were randomly assigned to the gains and losses reward structures.   
Design 
This experiment used a 2 (Gender: Male, Female) × 2 (Reward Structure: Gains, 
Losses) design.   Reward Structure was manipulated between subjects. 
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Stimuli and Stimulus Presentation 
I used the information integration stimuli shown in Figure 3.2.  The stimuli 
selection and presentation were identical to Experiment 3.  There were 48 trials in each 
block and 12 blocks. 
Materials 
I used the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ; Higgins et al., 2001), the Beck 
Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck et al. 1988), the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; 
Meyer et al., 1990), and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in individual cubicles and all instructions were presented 
on the computer screen and auditorally using headphones.  At the beginning of the 
classification task, participants were told that their job was to learn to classify items into 
two categories.  To induce a stereotype our participants read that men perform better than 
women on tests of spatial ability.  For example, participants in the gains task were 
presented with: 
This is an experiment testing sex differences in spatial abilities.  Recent research 
(Simon & Small, 2005) found that college students differ in their ability to think 
spatially.  Some students are better able to mentally separate objects into pieces.  
These students easily separate objects correctly and finish quickly.  In a large 
review of 286 studies, Voyer, Voyer, and Bryden (1995) determined that men 
perform better than women across a wide-range of spatial tasks.   
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Researchers have speculated on the aspects of our evolutionary environment that 
would have led to these differences.  For example, in early hunter-gatherer 
societies men were responsible for gathering wild game and fish for consumption, 
and so they had to develop accurate spatial maps of their environment.  This 
association between gender-roles and the early evolutionary environment may 
have led to differences in male and female brain development as well as 
differences in the brain's response to estrogen and testosterone. 
 
We are interested in further examining this sex difference.   
 
In this experiment, you will earn some points for correct responses and no points 
for incorrect responses. In this task, men tend to earn more than 86 points per 
block of trials and women tend to earn fewer than 86 points per block of trials.  
 
Please try your best in this task. Before continuing, please indicate whether you 
are male or female. If you are male, press the "M" key. If you are female, press 
the "F" key. 
 
In the gains task, participants were told that the men tended to earn more than 86 
points per block, which is equivalent to a 90% correct criterion (correct on 43 of 48 
trials), and women tended to earn fewer.  In the losses task, participants were told that 
men tended to lose less than 58 points per block, which is again equivalent to a 90% 
criterion (correct on 43 of 48 trials), and women tended to lose more. 
The remainder of the task procedure was identical to Experiment 3. 
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Results 
To test the hypotheses, I analyzed accuracy data and used quantitative models to 
give me insight into the strategies used by participants during the experimental task.  I 
also present the results from the pre- and post-test questionnaires.  The modeling results 
appear in a supplementary section following the discussion of this experiment. 
Questionnaire Results 
All of the significant comparisons in the questionnaire results appear in Table 
4.10.  Correlations appear in Table 4.11.  Prior to the experimental manipulation, 
participants completed the RFQ, the PSWQ, and the BAI.  There were neither significant 
interactions of reward structure and gender nor main effects of reward structure.  
However, there were main effects of gender.  Prior to the experimental manipulation, 
women scored higher than men on the Prevention subscale of the RFQ and on the PSWQ.  
Post the manipulation, I collected the Positive and Negative subscales of PANAS and 
ratings of liking, motivation, and expected performance.  Men expected to do better and 
predicted they would like the task more than women.  I also found a significant 
interaction for the Positive Affect subscale of the PANAS.  The data were analyzed using 
an ANOVA with Gender (Male, Female) and Reward Structure (Gains, Losses).  This 
analysis revealed a significant two-way interaction between Gender and Reward 
Structure, F(1,96) = 4.28, MSE = 73.1, p < .05.  Women in the losses and gains tasks 
averaged 33.8 and 27.7, respectively, and this difference was significant, t(48) = 2.7, p < 






 Women Men Test 
RFQ: Prevention subscale 19.3 (3.6) 16.7 (3.9) t(98) = 3.38, p < .05 
PSWQ 50.4 (13.4) 45.3 (14.5) t(98) = 1.82, p = .07 
Expected Performance 6.0 (1.9) 7.1 (1.2) t(98) = 3.4, p < .05 
Predicting Liking 5.1 (1.7) 6.0 (1.9) t(98) = 2.3, p < .05 
Table 4.10.  Significant comparisons in the Questionnaire data in Experiment 4 with 
means (standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
After the manipulation and classification task, I collected the PANAS and ratings 
of perceived performance.  I found a significant interaction for the performance ratings 
when the comparison group was women.  The data were analyzed using an ANOVA with 
Gender (Male, Female) and Reward Structure (Gains, Losses).  This analysis revealed a 
significant two-way interaction between Gender and Reward Structure, F(1,96) = 8.1, 
MSE = 2.7, p < .05.  Women in the losses and gains tasks averaged 6.3 and 7.0, 
respectively.  Men in the losses and gains tasks averaged 6.6 and 5.4, respectively and 
this difference was significant, t(48) = 2.3, p < .05.  ANCOVAs revealed that none of the 
significant effects found in the questionnaire data produced significant main effects or 













































































































































































1 0.007 0.052 -0.023 -0.094 -0.065 -0.141 -0.033 -0.094 0.016 0.093 -.226(*) .235(*) 0.14 0.167
Promotion
1 -0.074 -.286(**) -0.138 .334(**) -0.007 .220(*) .256(*) 0.028 .273(**) 0.039 0.148 .254(*) .202(*)
Prevention
1 0.088 -0.099 0.01 0.171 .236(*) .213(*) -0.046 0.002 -0.075 0.064 0.188 0.149
PSWQ
1 .362(**) -.205(*) 0.085 0.001 -0.107 .316(**) -0.175 .204(*) -0.09 -0.189 -0.082
BAI
1 -0.059 .219(*) 0.036 0.014 .362(**) -0.04 .368(**) -0.043 -0.131 -0.041
Expectation
1 .353(**) .309(**) .247(*) -0.16 0.002 0.027 .228(*) 0.126 0.156
Liking
1 .432(**) .467(**) 0 0.195 0.106 0.058 -0.009 0.038
Motivation
1 .631(**) -0.111 .213(*) 0.005 0.154 0.053 0.19
Positive PANAS 
(pre) 0.105 .570(**) 0.121 0.174 0.113 0.113
Negative PANAS 
(pre) 1 0.172 .478(**) -0.183 -0.093 -0.139
Positive PANAS 
(post) 1 -0.062 .357(**) .210(*) 0.188
Negative PANAS 




versus men 1 .557(**)
Performance 
versus women 1 
Note:  * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
Table 4.11.   Correlations between scales and total accuracy in Experiment 4.  Significant 
correlations appear in grey. 
 
Accuracy Analysis 
As for Experiments 1, 2, and 3, I computed the average accuracy for each 
participant in each block of trials, the proportion of participants reaching criterion (90% 
accuracy) for each block, and the first block that each participant met or exceeded this 
criterion.  Again, the criterion was established as part of the stereotype threat 
manipulation.  Participants were told that men tended to get the amount of points 
corresponding to 90% correct on the task, or more, whereas women did not. 
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Average accuracy for each participant for each block.  The data were analyzed 
using a repeated measures ANOVA with Gender (Male, Female) and Reward Structure 
(Gains, Losses) between participants and Blocks of trials within participants.  As shown 
in Figure 4.22, there was neither a significant interaction nor significant main effects of 
Gender or Reward Structure.  Within men and women, there was not a statistically 
reliable difference for performance on the gains (M = .82 and M = .84, respectively) and 


























Figure 4.22.  Proportion correct for women and men in the gains and losses tasks in 
Experiment 4 
Using a binomial sign test, as shown in Figure 4.23, men in the gains task 
performed better than men in the losses task, p < .05, and in fact obtained higher 
performance accuracy in 10 of the 12 experimental blocks.  Similarly, a binomial sign 
test reveals that women in the gains task performed better than women in the losses task, 






















































Figure 4.24.  Proportion correct across blocks for women in the gains and losses tasks in 
Experiment 4 
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Additionally, I used binomial sign tests to explore the accuracy data in a manner 
consistent with work on stereotype threat.  For gains, a binomial sign test reveals that 
women outperformed men, p< .05.  They performed better on 11 of 12 blocks of trials. 
For losses, women outperformed men on 10 of the 12 blocks, p < .05. 
Proportion of participants reaching criterion for each block.  I used binomial tests 
to assess whether the proportion of men who met or exceeded the criterion was larger in 
the losses as compared to the gains task.  As shown in Figure 4.25, the binomial test for 
block 8 revealed an advantage of the losses over the gains task, p < .05, and the test for 
block 12 revealed an advantage of the gains over the losses task, p < .05.  A binomial 
sign test across blocks did not reveal any differences.  Comparing male losses to female 




































Figure 4.25. Proportion reaching criterion across blocks for men in the gains and losses 
tasks in Experiment 4 
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As shown in Figure 4.26, for women in the gains task as compared to women in 
the losses task, the binomial test for block 8 revealed the advantage for the gains task, p < 
.05.  A binomial sign test across blocks revealed that women in the gains condition 
outperformed women in the losses condition in 8 of the 12 blocks.  This difference was 
statistically reliable, p < .05 (3 of the other blocks are ties).   Comparing female gains to 




































Figure 4.26.  Proportion reaching criterion across blocks for women in the gains and 
losses tasks in Experiment 4 
 
First block exceeding criterion.  Again, any participant who failed to meet the 
criterion during the experiment was coded as a 13.  Men in the gains condition exceeded 
the criterion sooner (after 8.7 blocks on average) as compared to men in the losses 
condition (after 9.4 blocks on average).  Women in the gains condition exceeded the 
criterion sooner (after 8.4 blocks on average) as compared to women in the losses 
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As for Experiment 3, I predicted that the regulatory mismatch groups (e.g., men in 
losses and women in gains) would outperform the match groups (e.g., men in gains and 
women in losses).  This is the opposite pattern of data obtained in Experiment 2.  
Consistent with the predictions from regulatory fit theory, women in the gains task were 
more accurate across blocks and more reached the criterion as compared to women in the 
losses task.  Further, as predicted, women in the gains task were more accurate than men 
in the gains task.  However, inconsistent with predictions, men in the gains task and 
women in the losses task were more accurate than men in the losses task. 
 
Model-based Analyses 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, an advantage of using the information-integration 
classification task is that I have a set of computational models that allow me to 
characterize participants’ responses on a block-by-block basis.   I fit the series of 
decision-bound unidimensional and conjunctive models used in Experiments 1 and 2 and 
incorporated general linear contrast models and conjunctive models that used the position 
dimension (Ashby & Maddox, 1993; Maddox & Ashby, 1993).  I fit two different general 
linear models.  First, I fit an optimal model which assumes the participant used the 
optimal criterion which has an intercept of zero and a slope of 1.  This model only has 
one free noise parameter.  Second, I fit a suboptimal model which assumes suboptimal 
intercept and slope criteria.  Therefore, this model has three free parameters: one for the 
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intercept, one for the slope, and one noise parameter.  I also fit conjunctive models that 
used position and length or position and orientation.  Each of these models has three free 
parameters: one for position, one for length or orientation, and one noise parameter.  As 
for Experiments 1 and 2, model parameters were estimated using maximum likelihood 
(Ashby, 1992).   
Before summarizing the model results, it is important to determine that the 
models provided a good account of the data.  The general linear model accounted for an 




Model 3 4 
General Linear Classifier 81.2 81.6 
Conjunctive 72.6 72.8 
Length 59.5 59.4 
Orient 40.6 40.3 
Position 82.0 82.1 
Table 4.12.   Percent of total category responses accounted for by each model type 
For both experiments, the unidimensional rules on length and orientation were 
rarely used by participants.  The unidimensional length and orientation models best fit the 
data <1% and <2% of the time, respectively.  In contrast, the unidimensional position 
model best fit 17.6% and 18.6% of the time and the conjunctive models best fit 49% of 
the time.  On average, the general linear classifier fit 27.7% and 26.1%, respectively.   
To determine the success of participants using each of the model types, the best 
fitting model for each block for each participant was matched with block accuracy.  On 
average, participants best fit by the general linear classifier were the most accurate for 
both experiments (M = 84% and 87%, respectively).  When participants were best fit with 
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the position model or conjunctive models, they scored an average of 82% in both 
experiments.   
The remaining model discussions will focus on the general linear classifier fits 
and specific predictions of regulatory fit theory. 
 
Experiment 3: Women primed with positive stereotype. Figure 4.27 displays the 
overall proportion of data sets best fit by a general linear classifier model for men and 
women in the gains and losses conditions. Because men in the gains condition and 
women in the losses condition are in a regulatory mismatch, I predicted that a larger 
proportion of data sets in these conditions would be best fit by a general linear classifier 
model.  For men, this pattern did not hold; a sign test across blocks did not reveal a 
significant difference between the gains and losses tasks.  Further, relative to men in the 
losses task, men in the gains task were more often fit across blocks by the position model 
(significant based on a sign test, p < .05) and by conjunctive models involving position 
(marginally significant based on a sign test, p = .07).  While not predicted, relative to 
women in the losses task, women in the gains task were more often fit by the general 
linear classifier in 7 of the 12 blocks of trials,  marginally significant based on a sign test, 
p = .07.  This trend was supported by a significant binomial test in block 1, p < .05.   
Analyzing the data in a manner consistent with stereotype threat, men in the gains 
task were more often fit by the general linear classifier than women, significant based on 
a sign test, p < .05, and women were more often fit by conjunctive models involving 
position, marginally significant based on a sign test, p = .07.  Using binomial tests, a 
higher proportion of data from men was fit by the general linear classifier in blocks 8, 9, 
and 10, p < .05.  The same pattern held in the losses task; men were more often fit by the 
general linear classifier, p < .05, and women were more often fit by conjunctive position 
101 
models, p < .05.  Binomial tests reveal more male data sets fit than female sets in blocks 
1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, p < .05, with a marginally significant test in block 8.   
 


































Figure 4.27.   Proportion best fit by the correct general linear classifier rule for women 
and men in the gains and losses tasks in Experiment 3 
In addition to examining proportions accounted for by different models, I 
considered when models best accounted for data sets.  I predicted that the mismatch 
groups’ (e.g., men with gains and women with losses) data sets should be fit by the 
general linear classifier earlier than the match groups.  As shown in Figure 4.28, on 
average, men were fit earlier in the experiment than women, F(1,76) = 5.68, MSE = 




































Figure 4.28.   Average first block best fit by the general linear classifier model for 
women and men in Experiment 3 
I also predicted that the match groups will exhibit behavior consistent with 
flexibility whereas the mismatch groups will not.  I examined whether the match groups 
(e.g., men in losses and women in gains) switched strategies more often or tried more 
strategies as compared to the mismatch groups (e.g., men in gains and women in losses), 
and whether the mismatch groups had longer runs of using the same strategy as compared 
to the match groups.  Using 2 Gender (Women, Men) x 2 Reward Structure (Gains, 
Losses) ANOVAs, there were not significant interactions of Gender and Reward 
Structure for the number of times a participant switched strategies, the number of 
strategies used by participants, or the longest run of consecutive strategy use.  However, 
as shown in Figures 4.29 and 4.30, my data is consistent with the claims that the match 
groups switched strategies more often and the mismatch groups had longer runs of 








































Figure 4.29.   Number of times modeling suggested a strategy switch for women and 








































Figure 4.30.   Longest run of the same strategy, measured in blocks, for women and men 




I examined the goodness of fit of the general linear model when it was selected as 
the best fitting model for a particular block.  For each subject, I extracted the percent of 
the data accounted for by the model.  I assume that the benefit of being in a regulatory 
mismatch will occur earlier in learning and predict that the mismatch participants will 
have more of their data fit in the first five blocks in terms of average data fits, a greater 
maximum value fit, and more improvement between the first and second consecutively fit 
blocks.   If participants were not fit best by the general linear model in the first five 
blocks of trials, they were dropped from the analyses.  Using 2 Gender (Women, Men) x 
2 Reward Structure (Gains, Losses) ANOVAs, there were not significant interactions of 
Gender and Reward Structure or main effects for the percent of the data accounted for by 
the general linear model in the first five blocks or the maximum value fit in the first five 
blocks. 
Because very few women in the losses task were best fit by the general linear 
model in consecutive blocks, I was only able to examine the improvement between the 
first and second consecutively fit blocks for the men.  The data for both men and women 
appear in Figure 4.31.  For men, participants in the gains task showed more improvement 





























Figure 4.31.   Percent improvement in general linear model fits between the first and 
second consecutively fit blocks for women and men in gains and losses in 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 4:  Men primed with a positive stereotype.  As predicted, as shown in 
Figure 4.32, men in the losses task were better fit overall by the general linear model as 
compared to men in the gains task, binomial test p < .05.  This overall difference is 
supported by significant binomial tests for blocks 1, 3, 7, and 9 demonstrating better fits 
for losses task participants, p < .05.  However, a binomial sign test across blocks did not 
reveal a significant difference between the gains and losses tasks.  For women, binomial 
tests demonstrate that those in the gains task were better fit by the general linear model 
overall as compared to those in the losses task, p < .05 (see Figure 4.32).  This overall 
test is supported by binomial tests showing significant advantages for women in the gains 
task in blocks 3, 5, 9, 12, p < .05, and marginally significant differences in blocks 1, 4, 
and 8, p < .08.  Further, women in the gains task were better fit in 10 of 12 blocks as 







































Figure 4.32.   Proportion best fit by the correct general linear classifier rule for women 
and men in the gains and losses tasks in Experiment 4 
Analyzing the data using binomial tests, in a manner consistent with prior 
stereotype threat work, men in gains were better fit by the general linear model in block 
3, marginally significant p < .08, while women in gains were better fit in block 7, 
marginally significant p < .08.  Further, women in the gains task were more often fit 
across blocks by conjunctive models using position as compared to men in the gains task, 
significant based on a sign test, p < .05.  Lastly, men in the losses task were more often fit 
across blocks by the general linear model as compared to women in the losses, significant 
based on a sign test, p < .05.  This difference is supported by significant binomial tests 
where men were better fit than women in blocks 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, p < .05, and marginally 
significant tests in blocks 4, 8, and 12, p < .08.  In contrast, as compared to men, women 
in the losses task were more often fit across blocks with conjunctive models that included 
position, significant based on a sign test, p < .05, and were better fit in 10 of the 12 
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blocks.  Similarly, a marginally significant sign test, p < .08, reveals that women were 
better fit in 7 of the 12 blocks (with 4 ties) by the position model as compared to men. 
As for Experiment 3, I analyzed how quickly participants were best fit by the 
general linear classifier model using a 2 Gender (Women, Men) x 2 Reward Structure 
(Gains, Losses) ANOVA.  As shown in Figure 4.33, men were fit earlier than women, 
F(1,99) = 3.79, MSE = 3.79, p < .05, but this main effect was qualified by a marginally 
significant interaction between gender and reward structure, F(1,99) = 3.05, MSE = 3.79, 
p = .08.  Women in the gains task were fit earlier (M = 7.04) than women in the losses 

































Figure 4.33.   Average first block best fit by the general linear classifier model for 
women and men in the gains and losses tasks in Experiment 4 
Similarly, I analyzed the number of strategies used, the number of times the 
strategy changed from block to block, and the longest run of the same strategy using 2 
Gender (Male, Female) x 2 Reward  (Gains, Losses) ANOVAs.  There were no 
significant interactions between Gender and Reward Structure for any of these dependent 
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measures.  However, as shown in Figure 4.34, there is a pattern consistent with the 
mismatch groups (e.g., women in gains and men in losses) having longer runs of the same 
consecutive strategy.  There was also a marginally significant main effect of Reward 
Structure on the number of different strategies used, F(1, 96) = 3.49, MSE = .73, p = .06.  
Participants in the losses task used more strategies (M = 3.2) on average than participants 




































Figure 4.34.   Longest run of the same strategy, measure in blocks, for women and men 
in the gains and losses tasks in Experiment 4 
 Again, as for Experiment 3, I examined the goodness of fit when the general 
linear contrast model was selected as the best fitting model for a given block.  Using 2 
Gender (Women, Men) x 2 Reward Structure (Gains, Losses) ANOVAs, there were not 
significant interactions for the average fit in the first five blocks of trials or for the 
maximum best fit in the first five blocks.  However, there was a significant main effect of 
Gender for the average fit, F(1,43) = 9.38, MSE = .005, p < .05; women had a higher 
percentage of their data fit (M = 85%) than men (M = 79%).  There was also a marginally 
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significant main effect of Gender for maximum fit in the first five blocks F(1, 43) = 3.45, 
MSE = .007, p = .07.  Again, women had a higher percentage of their data fit (M = 87%) 
relative to men (M = 82%).  Lastly, I analyzed the fit improvement between the first and 
second fit block in the first 5 blocks.  As for Experiment 3, too few women had two 
blocks fit and therefore as a group their data cannot be analyzed.  There was no 
difference in the fit improvement for men in the gains and losses tasks. 
 
General Discussion 
In Experiments 3 and 4, I found some data consistent with regulatory fit 
predictions and our interpretation of the stereotype threat literature.  Consistent with 
regulatory fit predictions, in Experiment 3, men in the gains task reached the criterion 
sooner than men in the losses task, and, in Experiment 4, women in the gains task 
performed better than women in the losses task.  Likewise, consistent with my 
interpretation of the stereotype threat literature, in the gains task, more men reached the 
criterion than women in Experiment 3, and women performed better than men in 
Experiment 4.    
Participants learned to classify lines into two categories.  These lines varied in 
length, orientation, and position on the screen.  Participants could perfectly classify the 
lines if they used an information-integration strategy and placed lines that were longer 
than they were steep into one category and all of the other lines into another category.  I 
predicted that this information-integration category structure would be better learned by 
individuals in a regulatory mismatch because those in a regulatory match would persist in 
explicit hypothesis testing.  Explicit hypothesis testing is not useful in learning 
information-integration category structures because the rule that separates the categories 
is not easily verbalizable.   
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In Experiment 3, I primed women with a positive stereotype and men with a 
negative stereotype.  I reversed the stereotype assignment in Experiment 4.  In both 
Experiments, half of the participants completed a gains version of the task where they 
gained points for correct responses and half completed a losses version of the task where 
they lost fewer points for correct responses than incorrect responses.  I predicted that a 
regulatory mismatch would occur when those primed with a negative stereotype 
completed the gains task and those primed with a positive stereotype completed the 
losses task.  Further, I predicted that participants in a regulatory mismatch would perform 
better in the classification task relative to participants in a regulatory match. 
 In Experiment 3, I found limited support for my predictions.  As predicted, in the 
gains task, more men reached the criterion than women in 10 of the 12 blocks of trials, 
and exceeded the criterion sooner as compared to men in the losses task.  However, 
contrary to my expectations, more men in the losses task also reached the criterion than 
women in the losses task in 7 of the 12 blocks.  And, women in the gains task performed 
better than women in the losses task in 10 of the 12 blocks. 
 Examining the questionnaire data, participants were well calibrated to their level 
of performance.  Women in the gains task believed they performed better, relative to 
other women in the experiment, than women in the losses task did.  Further, women rated 
their performance lower than men.  Interestingly, at the start of the experiment, women in 
the gains task expected to perform better than women in the losses task did and men in 
the losses task expected to perform better than men in the gains task did, although this 
comparison was not statistically reliable.  This first reaction to the task is what would 
have been predicted from regulatory fit theory.  Individuals experiencing a fit benefited 
from the presence of a match between their situationally-primed focus and the task 
context. 
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 In Experiment 4, I find some support for my predictions in the accuracy data and 
questionnaire data.  Women in the gains task performed better than women in the losses 
task in all 12 blocks of trials.  Further, in the gains task, women outperformed men in 11 
of the 12 blocks.  However, men in the gains task performed better than men in the losses 
task in 10 of the 12 experimental blocks.  In the losses task, women performed better than 
men in 10 of the 12 blocks.   
Examining the questionnaire data, again I find some support for the benefits of 
experiencing fit.  Women in the losses task rated their mood as higher at the beginning of 
the task relative to women in the gains task.  At the end of the task, relative to women in 
the experiment, women in the gains task rated their performance as higher than women in 
the losses task and men in the losses task rated their performance as higher than men in 
the gains task.  Interestingly, this performance rating corresponds to the presence of a 
regulatory match or mismatch and does not reflect actual task performance relative to the 
other groups.  
 The modeling results are generally consistent with my predictions, particularly in 
Experiment 4.  In Experiment 3, women were primed with a positive stereotype and men 
were primed with a negative stereotype.  I predicted that women in the gains task and 
men in the losses task would exhibit more flexible performance as compared to the 
mismatch groups and be less likely fit by the optimal general linear classifier model.  
Consistent with my predictions, men in the gains task and women in the losses task were 
more often fit by models that involve position as compared to men in the losses task 
suggesting limited rule testing.  These groups continued to use the likely default strategy 
and closely related strategies.  In addition, men in the gains task were more often fit by 
the general linear model as compared to women in the gains task.  I also found data 
patterns consistent with the match groups switching strategies more often and the 
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mismatch groups using the same strategy for more consecutive blocks, but these 
differences were not statistically reliable.   
 Contrary to my predictions, women in the losses task were less often fit by the 
general linear classifier as compared to women in the gains task and men in the losses 
task.  I predicted that women in the losses task were experiencing a regulatory mismatch 
and therefore were predicted to use a strategy consistent with the general linear classifier 
model.  Further, in the gains task, women were more often fit by conjunctive models 
involving position as compared to men.  Overall, men were best fit by the general linear 
classifier in earlier blocks relative to women.   
 In Experiment 4, men were primed with a positive stereotype and women with a 
negative stereotype.  As predicted, men in the losses task and women in the gains task 
were more often fit by the general linear classifier model as compared to men in the gains 
task and women in the losses task, respectively.  These groups were also fit earlier in the 
experiment by the general linear model.  In the losses task, men were also more often fit 
than women.  Further, in the gains task, women were more often fit by conjunctive 
position models relative to men.  Contrary to my predictions, in the losses task women 
were more often fit by position models than men.  Overall, women had a greater 
percentage of their data fit by the general linear model when it was selected as the best 
fitting model than men.    
Across these two experiments, the accuracy and modeling data is not completely 
consistent with my predictions from regulatory fit and stereotype threat.  I believe in part 
this inconsistency stems from the chosen stimulus space.  The stimulus structure may 
have allowed participants to get decent performance simply by using strategies consistent 
with conjunctive rules that use position instead of relying on the more optimal 
information-integration strategy.  Future research will use a stimulus structure that allows 
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for more differentiation between the optimal strategy and strategies that are more easily 
verbalizable.  My results and recent results by other researchers have prompted a revision 
of how information-integration category structures are constructed.   
In addition, comparing across the two experiments, there is a Gender x 
Experiment interaction.  Men performed better than women in Experiment 3 but women 
performed better than men in Experiment 4.  In Experiment 3, this main effect was 
coupled with earlier general linear classifier fits for the men.  This generally supports a 





Chapter 5:  Conclusions 
 
This dissertation examines the interaction between motivational factors that drive 
behavior, the stereotypes that induce them, the reward structure of tasks, and the type of 
task performed.  I argue that regulatory focus states, motivational variables, are induced 
when positive and negative stereotypes are primed.  Specifically, priming a negative 
stereotype induces a prevention focus and priming a positive stereotype induces a 
promotion focus.  Prior work on regulatory focus demonstrates that a prevention focus 
leads to sensitivity to losses and non-losses while a promotion focus leads to sensitivity to 
gains and non-gains (Higgins, 1987, 1997a).  Further, I demonstrate that task 
performance depends on the induced regulatory focus and the reward structure of the task 
environment.  When the focus matches the reward structure, participants are more 
cognitively flexible and engage in more explicit strategy testing than when participants 
are in a mismatch.  Lastly, I show that cognitive flexibility is advantageous in some tasks 
but not in others.   
In four experiments, I manipulated the primed stereotype assigned to men and 
women, the type of task performed, and the reward structure of the task.  I predicted a 
four-way interaction between Stereotype, Gender, Reward structure, and Task.  
Participants learned to classify lines that varied in length, orientation, and position on the 
screen into two categories.  The rule that could yield perfect classification varied across 
experiments.  In Experiments 1 and 2, the two categories to be learned could be perfectly 
distinguished using a verbalizable conjunctive rule.  In Experiments 3 and 4, the rule that 
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distinguished the categories was an information-integration rule which is not likely to be 
generated by testing easily verbalizable rules.  As such, individuals who flexibly tested 
rules were predicted to perform better in Experiments 1 and 2 but worse in Experiments 3 
and 4.  In the first two Experiments, testing lots of rules should provide good coverage of 
the relevant rule space allowing an individual to find the correct rule.  In contrast, the 
correct rule in Experiments 3 and 4 lies outside of the rule space likely searched by 
participants.  Therefore, persistence in searching the rule space will hinder performance 
because the correct rule will not be found and used. 
In all Experiments, participants were assigned to a gains reward structure where 
they gained more points for correct responses than for incorrect ones or were assigned to 
a losses reward structure in which they lost fewer points for correct responses relative to 
incorrect ones.  Some participants were primed with a positive stereotype and some with 
a negative stereotype.  Using regulatory fit theory, I predicted priming a positive 
stereotype induces a promotion focus leading to sensitivity to gains.  Therefore, 
individuals primed with a positive stereotype would experience a regulatory match in the 
gains version of the task and a mismatch in the losses version of the task.  In contrast, 
priming a negative stereotype induces a prevention focus leading to sensitivity to losses.  
Negative-stereotype priming places individuals in a regulatory match in the losses 
environment and a regulatory mismatch in the gains environment.   
Further, prior research on regulatory fit demonstrates that regulatory matches 
promote more flexible rule testing than regulatory mismatches (Maddox et al., 2006; 
Maddox et al., 2007; Markman, Baldwin et al., 2005; Markman, Maddox et al., 2005; 
Markman et al., 2006).  Therefore, I predicted individuals in a regulatory match should 
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perform better in Experiments 1 and 2, where flexible rule testing is advantageous, but 
worse in Experiments 3 and 4, where flexible testing is disadvantageous.  The opposite 
pattern was predicted for individuals in a regulatory mismatch. 
In Experiments 1 and 2, men and women performed a classification task for 
which flexible rule testing is advantageous.  In Experiment 1, participants were told 
women tended to perform better than men while in Experiment 2, participants were told 
men tended to perform better than women.  Behavioral accuracy data and model-based 
analyses supported our predictions.  Individuals experiencing a regulatory match 
performed better on the task and their data was more consistent with an application of the 
correct classification rule relative to individuals in a regulatory mismatch.   
In Experiments 3 and 4, participants completed a classification task for which 
flexible rule testing is disadvantageous.  Participants were told women tended to perform 
better in Experiment 3 and men tended to perform better in Experiment 4.  In both 
Experiments, the accuracy data was not entirely consistent with my predictions.  Overall, 
individuals in the gains task performed better than those in the losses task.  However, in 
the gains task, the individuals primed with a negative stereotype performed better.  That 
is, the mismatch groups performed better; men performed better in Experiment 3 and 
women performed better in Experiment 4.  The model-based analyses revealed a pattern 
closer to our predictions.  In Experiment 3, male data was more often fit by the correct 
rule than female data.  In Experiment 4, the mismatch groups’ data was more consistent 
with using the correct rule than the match groups’ data.     
In this chapter, I will revisit stereotype threat effects in the literature.  I will 
discuss how my theoretical approach can illuminate prior results and what factors need to 
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be included to explain stereotype threat.  Second, I will briefly review neural mechanisms 
that may underlie flexible rule testing behaviors given a regulatory match.  Third, I will 
highlight a set of related individual differences that should be examined in future work, 
and lastly discuss some practical implications of my approach and present data from an 
experiment that applies our theoretical approach to math performance.       
STEREOTYPE THREAT IMPLICATIONS 
This dissertation claims to be able to account for stereotype threat effects using 
regulatory fit.  As demonstrated in rule-based classification, negative stereotype priming 
leads to better performance in losses environments than gains and positive stereotype 
priming lead to better performance in gains than losses.  However, it is still an open 
question as to whether this effect is merely another way to demonstrate and ameliorate 
stereotype threat or if this perspective can account for a range of findings in the 
stereotype threat literature. 
To address this issue, I revisit some of the most influential and most often cited 
studies discussed in Chapter 2.  I consider specific task contexts to classify prior work as 
instantiations of gains environments and describe possible ways to create losses 
environments.  My goals are to postdict study results and predict results given losses 
versions of the tasks.  Further, I will discuss what factors are necessary to include in 
explaining stereotype threat. 
Much of the work on stereotype threat has been completed using verbal and math 
tests.  Unintentionally creating a gains context, Steele and Aronson (1995) told subjects 
that they should not expect to get many questions correct in all experimental conditions.  
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Merely mentioning correct responding may be enough to frame a test as a gains 
environment.  Therefore, Steele and Aronson created a regulatory mismatch when Black 
participants were told the test was diagnostic of their ability or had their race highlighted.  
These Black participants were prevention-focused in a gains environment.  To reverse 
this effect, the test could be described as one where subjects should expect to get many 
questions incorrect.  This creates a losses context and should improve performance of 
Black participants in the diagnostic and race prime conditions.  Likewise, Keller and 
Dauenheimer (2003) created a gains environment by emphasizing to students that they 
needed to solve as many problems as possible and demonstrated the classic stereotype 
threat effect with women and math.  A simple change of instructions telling students to 
avoid getting problems incorrect would reverse their effects. 
Similarly, Spencer et al. (1999) asked participants to take the GRE (see also 
Spencer & Quinn, 2001).  As part of the test instructions, participants read the standard 
GRE scoring from 1999: correct items get 1 point, blank items get no deductions, and 
incorrect items get a deduction to correct for guessing.  Technically-speaking, this point 
structure is a mixed structure composed of both gains and losses.  However, the correct 
and blank items’ scoring matches the gains environment used in our studies and the 
incorrect scoring is a small loss that may not be well understood by participants.  As 
such, it appears this test context is more of a gains environment than a losses 
environment.  Therefore, their female participants underperformed relative to men on the 
difficult math test because they were experiencing a regulatory mismatch.  To reverse this 
effect, correct items would have fewer points lost than blank items or guesses. 
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Using a different domain, Stone et al. (1999) had participants complete a golf 
course and measured performance using the number of strokes to complete the course.  
They found that groups with negative stereotypes performed worse than those without.  
There was an elaborate cover story given to participants.  Each participant completed 10 
rounds.  In each round they were told to try to get the ball in a hole in the fewest strokes 
possible.  There were multiple possible holes: a small hole earning 1 point, a medium 
hole earning 2 points, and a large hole earning 3 points.  Subjects were told to try to 
maximize their points.  This is clearly a gains environment.  It is unclear why this point 
system was used and the researchers do not report actual points earned, which is very 
problematic because subjects were trying to maximize their earned points.  One could 
imagine that subjects passed by closer lower-point holes and took more shots to get more 
points.   At any rate, to reverse their effects, one would simply need to frame the test in 
terms of lost points and tell subjects to minimize points lost. 
There are also a series of studies that fail to describe procedures well enough to 
determine if an explicit gains environment was created (Aronson et al., 1999; Shih et al., 
1999).  For example, Aronson et al. (1999) does not describe the instructions students 
read that relate to the math test.  They only describe the content of the stereotype threat 
manipulations.  However, like all laboratory studies, students are completing experiments 
to gain course credit or pay.  Without disconfirming evidence, I believe that these studies 
could be consistent with my perspective.  
As reviewed in Chapter 2, there are many highlighted mechanisms for stereotype 
threat some of which appear to match what would be expected if negative stereotypes 
induce a prevention focus.  For example, stereotype avoidance (Steele & Aronson, 1995), 
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self-doubt activation (Steele & Aronson, 1995), anxiety (Spencer et al., 1999), and 
negative thinking (Cadinu et al., 2006) are all factors that seem consistent with a 
prevention focus.  The literature on regulatory focus suggests that a prevention focus is 
linked to anxiety and avoidance. 
Further, there are other factors in the literature which may reduce the likelihood 
that a prevention focus is induced and therefore influence performance.  For example, 
Spencer et al. (1999) frame a test as not showing gender differences in the past and 
demonstrate that stereotype threat effects went away (see also Keller & Dauenheimer, 
2003).  Similarly, providing an alternative explanation for performance or a self-handicap 
(Stone et al., 1999; Ben-Zeev et al., 2003) or giving participants a working memory dual-
task (Beilock et al., 2006) reduces stereotype threat effects.  I would argue these 
manipulations worked because a prevention focus was not induced or was masked 
thereby not interacting negatively with the gains task structure. 
However, it may not be so simple.  Brown and Josephs (1999) manipulated test 
framing.  Some participants were told the test was diagnostic of weak ability while others 
were told the test was diagnostic of exceptional ability.  Let us assume, as did Keller and 
Bless (2006), that the weak ability condition primes prevention and the exceptional 
ability condition primes promotion.  Further, let us assume that the environment was an 
implicit gains environment; students were trying to get math questions correct and were 
earning credit for a course research requirement.  If these assumptions are correct, 
regulatory fit cannot account for the pattern of data.  For men, a “prevention” (mismatch) 
state produces better performance than a “promotion” (match) state while a “prevention” 
state produces worse performance for women than a “promotion” state. 
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If, however, we attend to Brown and Josephs’ argument that the weak ability 
condition corresponds to the performance concerns of women and the exceptional ability 
condition corresponds to the performance concerns of men, our predictions change.  
Given that men want to avoid not appearing exceptional and women want to avoid 
appearing weak, these conditions may be inducing a prevention focus, causing a 
regulatory mismatch, which reduces performance levels.  Interpreting the test framing in 
this way allows the data to be interpreted as consistent with regulatory fit predictions.  
This study highlights the importance of determining what conditions induce a prevention 
focus.        
Lastly, there are other factors that probably are working in concert with regulatory 
fit to create experimental effects, such as domain identification (Aronson et al., 1999; 
Stone et al., 1999) with testosterone as a moderator (Josephs et al., 2003), task difficulty 
(Spencer et al., 1999), and working memory capacity (Schmader & Johns, 2003; Beilock 
& Carr, 2005; Beilock et al., 2006; Beilock et al., 2004).  For example, Aronson et al. 
(1999, Experiment 2) demonstrate that high math identifiers perform worse in a 
stereotype threat condition but better in a control condition relative to moderate math 
identifiers.  Using prior work, the stereotype threat condition is a regulatory mismatch 
and the control is a regulatory match.  If we assume that domain identification magnifies 
the effect of the induced focus state, high identifiers should do worse in a mismatch than 
low identifiers but better in a match.  This is the pattern of data found by Aronson et al.  
Further, as demonstrated by Josephs and colleagues,  testosterone may moderating 
influence domain investment/identification on stereotype threat (Josephs, Newman, 
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Brown, & Beer, 2003), potentially magnifying further the effect of the induced state.  
Future research should investigate this possibility. 
This interpretation is supported by a meta-analytic review of stereotype lift 
(Walton & Cohen, 2003).  Walton and Cohen found that individuals with positive 
stereotypes (e.g., men and Whites) perform better when tests are framed a diagnostic of 
ability.  This effect is completely consistent with the claim in this dissertation assuming 
most tasks are gains environments.  Further, Walton and Cohen found that individuals 
from these groups performed better when they were high identifiers relative to low 
identifiers.  I would argue these groups are in a strong regulatory match. 
Likewise, task difficulty surely interacts with regulatory fit effects.  In our prior 
work we demonstrate the interaction of fit and task difficulty.  In Grimm et al. (in press), 
the effect of regulatory fit on a rule-based task was smaller than the effect of regulatory 
fit on a rule-based task by Maddox et al. (2006).  In that study, however, the rule to be 
learned was more complex than the simple unidimensional rules in Grimm et al.  We 
expect larger motivational effects when tasks are difficult than when they are easy. 
Beilock’s research demonstrates the role of working memory in producing 
stereotype threat effects for proceduralized tasks (Beilock & Carr, 2005; Beilock et al., 
2006; Beilock et al., 2004).    In tasks that are well-learned, Beilock et al. (2004) argue 
that stereotype threat and situational pressure situations use similar mechanisms to 
produce performance decrements.  Like “choking under pressure,” stereotype threat 
induces explicit monitoring of performance which hurts tasks that are automatized.  In 
contrast, Schmader and Johns (2003) demonstrates that stereotype threat reduces working 
memory capacity and therefore hurts performance.  As Beilock et al. (2006) note, the 
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exact impact of stereotype threat on working memory appears to greatly depend on the 
type of task performed.   
The Schmader and Johns (2003) task appears to be an explicit more rule-based 
task and the Beilock et al. (2006) task to be an implicit task.  Based on the results from 
this dissertation, the negatively stereotyped group (given an implicit gains environment) 
should have done worse in Schmader and Johns because of less flexible processing, 
possibly the result of a lower working memory capacity.   For a more procedural task, I 
predicted better performance for this group in the information-integration task and got 
mixed results, which may be consistent with in Beilock et al.  Subjects did persist in 
using rules on the position dimension.  This could suggest explicit inflexible monitoring 
of performance, instead of a reliance on the procedural system.  Future research should 
continue to investigate how working memory relates to stereotype threat effects. 
POSSIBLE NEURAL MECHANISMS 
The long-term success of this research program does rely on creating a neurally 
plausible model to account for differences in regulatory fit.  In this section, I speculate on 
regions and systems that might be involved.  Most related to the work in this dissertation, 
Seger and colleagues study the role of the caudate in classification learning (Cincotta & 
Seger, 2007; Seger & Cincotta, 2005, 2006).  The caudate is part of the basal ganglia.  
Within this structure, the caudate and the putamen make up a substructure, the striatum.  
Seger (2006) argues that the striatum is connected to the cortex in 4 different pathways 
that have different functions.  The executive pathway connects the head of the caudate 
with the dorsolateral prefrontal and posterior parietal regions.  The visual pathway 
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connects the body and tail of the caudate with the temporal cortex and ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex.  The motor pathway connects the putamen to the premotor and somato-
sensory areas, and the motivational pathway connects the ventral striatum to the 
orbitofrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate.   
We are most interested in regions that process feedback because the task reward 
environment is a critical component of regulatory fit.  Prior work by Seger and Cincotta 
suggests that our classification task relies on the head of the caudate which processes 
feedback (Cincotta & Seger, 2007).  In a rule-based task, this region was more active at 
the start of learning, while areas in the cortex were more active later (Pasupathy & Miller, 
2005; Seger & Cincotta, 2005), which may suggest a processing of the reward context.  
Furthermore, the head of the caudate shows stronger patterns of activation given positive 
feedback relative to negative feedback (Filoteo et al., 2005; Seger & Cincotta, 2005).  
Seymour, Dew, Dayan, Singer, and Dolan (2007) argue that more anterior regions of the 
striatum show relative selectivity for gains while more posterior regions of the striatum 
show relative selectivity for losses. 
While there are probably many regions involved when subjects complete our 
classification tasks, some researchers have argued that different regions are recruited for 
the rule-based and information-integration versions of our classification tasks.  The 
COVIS model of multiple memory systems (Ashby et al., 1998; Ashby & Waldron, 
1999), suggests that the rule-based task mostly takes place in frontal brain regions which 
are used for flexible processing while the information-integration task is likely mostly 
learned by a procedural system instantiated in sub-cortical areas, such as the basal ganglia 
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(Maddox & Ashby, 2004).  Further, information-integration learning is supported by 
dopamine release in these areas (Ashby et al., 1998).   
A growing body of research suggests that the basal ganglia and the cortex interact 
during the course of learning.  As noted above, the basal ganglia is activated earlier in 
learning relative to the cortex.  Pasupathy and Miller (2005) trained monkeys to respond 
to two visual cues with distinct saccadic eye movements.  They argue that the time-
course in monkeys demonstrates sub-cortical areas are recognizing the reward context 
and then ‘train’ the prefrontal cortex.  Interestingly, the behavioral data corresponds 
better to cortical activation patterns than to caudate activation patterns.  So, while the 
caudate may assess the context more quickly, this system may be reliably slower to learn.  
As a caveat, work by Poldrack and colleagues (Poldrack & Rodriguez, 2004) 
demonstrates that the medial temporal lobe is active before the caudate but quickly 
deactivates.  They suggest that the medial temporal lobe and the caudate may be learning 
independently and that the prefrontal cortex selects which region governs responding.  
The medial temporal lobe (e.g., the hippocampus) guides earlier responding but after 
extended training the caudate directs behavior (Poldrack & Packard, 2003). 
It may be that regulatory fit determines whether cortical or sub-cortical areas 
govern responses or the speed at which a transition occurs from cortical to sub-cortical 
systems.  In a regulatory match, behavioral and model-based analyses demonstrate 
participants are engaged in more explicit rule-based testing.  This explicit testing seems 
consistent with use of cortical areas.  In contrast, in a regulatory mismatch, less rule-
based strategy testing is employed, which suggests that sub-cortical systems are guiding 
responses. 
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While all of this is speculative, these different strategies seem to correspond to the 
behavior of the locus-coeruleus.  The locus-coeruleus is a group of neurons located in the 
pons, part of the brainstem.  Aston-Jones and Cohen (2005) argue that the locus-
coeruleus tracks task performance.  There are two main modes of neural firing: tonic and 
phasic.  The tonic mode is associated with disengagement from the task and a search for 
other options, while the phasic mode focuses processing on the current task.  Aston-Jones 
and Cohen name these two modes exploration and exploitation, respectively.  Intuitively, 
exploration and exploitation strategies map onto previously documented regulatory match 
and mismatch behavior.  Those in a regulatory match seem to explore the rule space on 
tasks while those in a regulatory mismatch do not.   
While these parallels are intriguing, it is unclear whether the firing modes in the 
locus-coeruleus really could scale-up to create strategy differences seen in our regulatory 
match and mismatch participants.  The locus-coeruleus projects to cortical and sub-
cortical areas and is projected to from the orbitofrontal cortex and the anterior-cingulate.  
Interestingly, it does not project to the caudate.  Based on these connections, one 
plausible model of fit effects starts with a match or a mismatch state being recognized in 
the anterior-cingulate or orbitofrontal cortex, which tracks reward.  These areas then 
project to the locus-coeruleus initiating a phasic or tonic mode of firing.  The projections 
from the locus-coeruleus may then promote exploration in cortical areas or cause 
exploitation by inhibiting responding, which would allow the sub-cortical structures to 
take over and guide behavior.   
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THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
My results have theoretical and methodological implications for the study of 
stereotype threat and cognition more generally.  Theoretically, I hope cross-disciplinary 
work like this will lead to further research on the influence of motivation on cognitive 
processing.  There are a host of related individual difference variables, such as self-
construal (Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000; Marx, Stapel, & Muller, 2005), defensive 
pessimism (Elliot & Church, 2003; Yamawaki, Tschanz, & Feick, 2004), sensitivity to 
reward and punishment (Avila & Parcet, 2002; Poy, Eixarch, & Avila, 2004; Torrubia, 
Avila, Molto, & Caseras, 2001), fear of isolation (Kim & Markman, 2006; see Walton & 
Cohen, 2007 for a FOI type manipulation with racial stereotypes), mortality salience 
(Arndt, Lieberman, Cook, & Solomon, 2005; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, 
& Breus, 1994; Landau et al., 2006; Wisman & Goldenberg, 2005), and achievement 
motivation (Elliot, 1999; Hyde & Kling, 2001).   
For example, one such variable, self-construal, has been linked to regulatory focus 
(Lee et al., 2000) and to stereotype threat (Marx et al., 2005). Self-construal is an 
individual’s view of self.  The self is thought to be a collection of attributes, such as 
brown hair, and roles the self plays in relation to others, such as parent (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991).  Individuals with relatively more attributes are independent and those 
with relatively more roles are interdependent.  There is evidence that self-construals vary 
across cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) and within cultures (Cross & Madson, 1997).  
Furthermore, priming studies that manipulate self-construal demonstrate effects of self-
construal on cognitive processing (Geodert, Grimm, Markman, & Spellman, 2007; Kim, 
Grimm, & Markman, 2007).  Lee et al. (2000) provide evidence that an independent self-
128 
construal leads to greater preference for items framed in terms of promotion and an 
interdependent self-construal leads to greater preference for items framed in terms of 
prevention.  Further, Marx et al. (2005) demonstrate that a group with a negative 
stereotype completed a pronoun task with more interdependent pronouns (e.g., we, our) 
than independent pronouns (e.g., me, mine).   
My approach suggests that self-construal will also interact with the reward 
structure of the environment.  Independent individuals may prefer promotion-framed 
items because that primed self-construal induces a promotion focus while an 
interdependent-primed self-construal induces a prevention focus.  Likewise, Marx et al. 
find self-construal priming because of the induced regulatory focus.  Future studies will 
investigate this possibility. 
  A related individual difference variable is fear of isolation (Kim & Markman, 
2006).  Fear of isolation (FOI) can occur in situations in which one feels lonely or 
anxious by virtue of being isolated from others.  Like self-construal, FOI varies cross-
culturally.  Kim and Markman (2006) verified that East Asians have a greater FOI than 
American college students or European-born students.  Furthermore, their experimental 
studies demonstrate that priming FOI leads to preference for dialectical proverbs and a 
greater sensitivity to contextual elements.  Future work by Art Markman, Kyungil Kim, 
and I will consider the link between self-construal and fear of isolation.  Art Markman 
and I already have some unpublished data suggesting these variables behave similarly.   
A high fear of isolation seems to be related to a prevention focus and to stereotype 
threat.  A high FOI is associated with anxiety, an emotion that is a hallmark of a 
prevention focus.  In addition, Walton and Cohen (2007) manipulated social belonging by 
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telling some students to list 8 friends who would fit in well in their department while 
other students listed 2 friends.  Minority students who listed 8 friends reported a lower 
sense of fit in the major than those who listed 2 friends.  Dissertation data collected by 
Kim (2005), under the supervision of Markman, suggests that asking students to list an 
unrealistically large number of friends induces a high FOI.   Current work by Jason Lee, 
Art Markman, and I investigates whether the interaction between FOI (high, low) and the 
task reward structure (gains, losses) will mimic regulatory fit effects.  We predict that 
priming a high FOI induces a prevention focus and priming a low FOI induces a 
promotion focus.  This would suggest that Walton and Cohen’s stereotype threat effect 
resulted from regulatory fit-related priming.   
Another closely related variable is mortality salience.  Mortality salience  is 
derived from Terror Management Theory  (Arndt et al., 2005; Greenberg et al., 1994; 
Landau et al., 2006; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989; 
Wisman & Goldenberg, 2005) , which maintains that individuals are afraid of death and 
want to be immortal.  To support this claim, terror management researchers prime 
mortality salience by asking participants to write about what it will feel like to die and to 
discuss how thoughts of their death make them feel.  Then, researchers measure 
expressions of a desire to be immortal.  For example, Rosenblatt et al. (1989) examined 
bail amounts handed down by municipal court judges.  Some judges were asked to write 
about their death (e.g., high mortality salience) while others were not (e.g., low mortality 
salience).  Judges then read a case study about an arrested prostitute and recommended a 
bail amount.  Judges in the high mortality salience condition generated higher bail 
amounts than judges in the low mortality salience condition.  Rosenblatt et al. argue that 
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higher bail amounts demonstrate a desire to uphold social norms.  Upholding social 
norms is one means to attaining immortality.  That is, people are more likely to remember 
you when you are gone.   
Much like fear of isolation, high mortality salience seems like a prevention focus.  
Individuals are primed to be vigilant and anxious.  Prior work on regulatory focus has 
argued that a prevention focus leads to more vigilant processing where individuals worry 
about misses while a promotion focus leads to more elaborative processing where 
individuals focus on hits in a recognition memory task (Friedman & Forster, 2001).  Art 
Markman and I have some unpublished data linking mortality salience with fear of 
isolation and self-construal.  Future work will investigate whether mortality salience 
primes induce a prevention focus and can produce regulatory fit effects on cognitive 
tasks.  By studying the relationships between these and other individual differences, 
researchers may be able to posit similar mechanisms.   
Furthermore, methodologically, there are a host of individual difference variables 
that could benefit from using well-understood tasks from cognitive psychology (Narvaez 
& Markman, 2006).  For example, self-construal has been studied in the domain of casual 
induction (Kim et al., 2007).  This is a domain with a rigorous mathematical definition 
for what it might mean to be sensitive to the presence or absence of causes.  In our tasks, 
we used mathematical models to characterize performance.  These models allow us to be 
more confident about what participants are actually doing in the service of completing 
our task.  
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PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Practically, our work suggests a way around stereotype threat.  By elaborating on 
the observation by Seibt and Förster (2004), we demonstrate that it is possible to change 
relatively minor aspects of the task environment to get large differences in performance.  
This suggests that it is possible to reverse the negative effects of negative stereotypes by 
changing small task characteristics.  Performing well in a domain typically associated 
with a negative stereotype may be an excellent first step in curbing performance 
decrements caused by negative stereotype encounters.  
To investigate this possibility, we extended my dissertation work to consider 
regulatory fit effects in mathematics.  There have been numerous studies in stereotype 
threat comparing the performance of women and men on math tests.  It is assumed that 
individuals have the stereotype that women are bad at math.  Using our theoretical 
perspective, women who take a math test would have a prevention focus while men 
would have a promotion focus.  Therefore, men should do well in a gains test 
environment relative to a losses environment while the opposite is predicted for women. 
Without manipulating task-relevant stereotypes, we told students they were going 
to take a math test that was diagnostic of their ability in math.  Students then completed 
20 questions from the GRE.  Students in the gains environment earned points for correct 
responses and students in the losses environment lost fewer points for correct responses.  
There were approximately 20 women and 20 men in each reward structure.  We analyzed 
our data using a 2 Gender (Female, Male) x 2 Reward structure (Gains, Losses) 
ANCOVA.  We took math importance into account as a covariate.  As shown in Figure 
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5.1, there is an interaction of Gender and Test Type, F(1,74) = 5.12, MSE = 216.53, p < 


























Figure 5.1.   Percent correct on the GRE for men and women in gains and losses test 
environments 
 
Women in the losses version of the test got more test problems correct as 
compared to women in the gains version of the test, F(1,39) = 7.23, MSE = 146.09, p <  
.05.  In contrast, men in the gains test got more problems correct than men in the losses 
test.  However, this difference is not statistically significant.  This is exactly the pattern of 
data predicted.  Women are assumed to have a negative stereotype and were predicted to 
be sensitive to a test with losses and non-losses emphasized and therefore perform better.  
The losses environment matches their underlying motivational focus.   
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I would also like to note the size of the difference between the gains and losses 
versions of the tests for female students.  While the test was clearly difficult for this 
group of students, women in the losses test scored 10% better than women in the gains 
test.  This clearly is a meaningful improvement.   
Future work will continue to examine the role of regulatory fit effects on the 
performance of women in mathematics.  The regulatory fit perspective suggests that there 
are two key methods for reducing or eliminating the performance decrements that result 
from regulatory mismatches (e.g., negative math stereotypes and gains environments).  
One is altering the elements that activate the prevention focus and the other is to alter the 
test environment.  Our future work will investigate both of these methods.  Importantly, 
we will work on developing strategies that female students can use when they encounter a 





REGULATORY FOCUS QUESTIONNAIRE (RFQ: HIGGINS ET AL., 2001) 
 
This set of questions asks you HOW FREQUENTLY specific events actually occur or have 
occurred in your life.  Please indicate your answer to each question by pressing the appropriate 
key. 
 
 Response Options for Statements 
Certainly 
False 
   
Certainly 
True 
 Response Options for Questions 
Never or 
seldom 
 Sometimes  Very often 
1 
Compared to most people, are you 
typically unable to get what you want out 
of life? 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 
Growing up would you ever “cross the 
line” doing things that your parents would 
not tolerate? 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 
How often have you accomplished things 
that got you “psyched” to work even 
harder? 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 
Did you get on your parents’ nerves often 
when you were growing up? 
1 2 3 4 5 
5 
How often did you obey rules and 
regulations that were established by your 
parents? 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 
Growing up, did you ever act in ways that 
your parents thought were objectionable? 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 
Do you often do well at different things 
that you try? 
1 2 3 4 5 
8 
Not being careful enough has gotten me 
into trouble at times. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9 
When it comes to achieving things that 
are important to me, I find that I don’t 
perform as well as I ideally would like to. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10 
I feel like I have made progress toward 
being successful in my life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11 
I have found very few hobbies or 
activities in my life that can capture my 
interest or motivate me to put effort into 
them. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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BECK ANXIETY INVENTORY (BAI: BECK ET AL., 1988) 
For the following items, give an answer from the 1 through 4 scale indicating how much 
you have been bothered by each symptom during the PAST WEEK, INCLUDING 
TODAY, by pressing the appropriate number key. 
  Not at all Mildly Moderately Severely 
1 Numbness or tingling 1 2 3 4 
2 Feeling hot 1 2 3 4 
3 Wobbliness in legs 1 2 3 4 
4 Unable to relax 1 2 3 4 
5 Fear of the worst happening 1 2 3 4 
6 Dizzy or lightheaded 1 2 3 4 
7 Heart pounding or racing 1 2 3 4 
8 Unsteady 1 2 3 4 
9 Terrified 1 2 3 4 
10 Nervous 1 2 3 4 
11 Feelings of choking 1 2 3 4 
12 Hands trembling 1 2 3 4 
13 Shaky 1 2 3 4 
14 Fear of losing control 1 2 3 4 
15 Difficulty breathing 1 2 3 4 
16 Fear of dying 1 2 3 4 
17 Scared 1 2 3 4 
18 Indigestion or discomfort in abdomen 1 2 3 4 
19 Faint 1 2 3 4 
20 Face flushed 1 2 3 4 
21 Sweating (not due to heat) 1 2 3 4 
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PENN STATE WORRY QUESTIONNAIRE (PSWQ: MEYER ET AL., 1990)  
 
For the following items, give an answer from the 1 through 5 scale that best describes how typical 
or characteristic each item is of you by pressing the appropriate number key. 
 
  









If I don’t have enough time to do 
everything, I don’t worry about it. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 My worries overwhelm me. 1 2 3 4 5 
3 I don’t tend to worry about things. 1 2 3 4 5 
4 Many situations make me worry. 1 2 3 4 5 
5 
I know I shouldn’t worry about things, 
but I just can’t help it. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 
When I am under pressure I worry a 
lot. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 I am always worrying about something. 1 2 3 4 5 
8 
I find it easy to dismiss worrisome 
thoughts. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9 
As soon as I finish one task, I start to 
worry about everything else I have to 
do. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10 I never worry about anything. 1 2 3 4 5 
11 
When there is nothing more I can do 
about a concern, I don’t worry about it 
anymore. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12 I’ve been a worrier all my life. 1 2 3 4 5 
13 
I notice that I have been worrying 
about things. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14 Once I start worrying, I can’t stop. 1 2 3 4 5 
15 I worry all the time. 1 2 3 4 5 
16 
I worry about projects until they are all 
done. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE AFFECT SCHEDULE (PANAS: WATSON ET AL., 1988)  
 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions.  Read each 






not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
1 Interested 1 2 3 4 5 
2 Distressed 1 2 3 4 5 
3 Excited 1 2 3 4 5 
4 Upset 1 2 3 4 5 
5 Strong 1 2 3 4 5 
6 Guilty 1 2 3 4 5 
7 Scared 1 2 3 4 5 
8 Hostile 1 2 3 4 5 
9 Enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 
10 Proud 1 2 3 4 5 
11 Irritable 1 2 3 4 5 
12 Alert 1 2 3 4 5 
13 Ashamed 1 2 3 4 5 
14 Inspired 1 2 3 4 5 
15 Nervous 1 2 3 4 5 
16 Determined 1 2 3 4 5 
17 Attentive 1 2 3 4 5 
18 Jittery 1 2 3 4 5 
19 Active 1 2 3 4 5 
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